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Abstract
In Search of Homo Sociologicus
by
Yunqi Xue
Adviser: Dr. Rohit Parikh
The subject of this dissertation is to build an epistemic logic system that is able to
show the spreading of knowledge and beliefs in a social network that contains multiple
subgroups. Epistemic logic is the study of logical systems that express mathematical
properties of knowledge and belief. In recent years, there have been increasing number
of new epistemic logic systems that are focused on community properties such as
knowledge and belief adoption among friends.
We are interested in revisable and actionable social knowledge/belief that leads
to a large group action. Instead of centralized coordination, bottom-up approach is
our focus. We explore multiple methods of belief revision in social networks. Such
belief revision in groups represents social influence and power to some degree. Both
influence from friends and from experts are explained.
We define an intuitive concept of expected influence of a group. When different
influence sources are suggesting conflicting actions, agents could make strategic
decisions by analyzing expected influence of different subgroups. We then show some
properties of expected influence in different network structures. We also simulate the




It’s been a long but wonderful journey. I can never have done it without all the
people who supported me.
My deepest gratitude goes to my dear supervisor, Dr. Parikh. I met him while I
was still a master’s student in Amsterdam. My background in economics and logic
was unconventional for a computer science PhD student. My research interests are
inherently interdisciplinary. However Dr. Parikh has deep knowledge in all these fields.
He guided me in these fields and showed me how to connecting them back to computer
science. In addition to his excellent academic guidance, he also takes good care of his
students as if they were his family. I am particularly in awe that he made a few trips
to California after I moved and gave birth to my son, considering that it is hard for
me to travel with a young baby. During these visits, we worked on numerous papers.
He is the best supervisor anyone can imagine of, and particularly for a young mother.
I thank my committee members, Dr. Liu, Dr. Jain and Dr. Yanofsky for their
continuous support and guidance. I met Dr. Liu in Amsterdam during my master
study. Her work had always fascinated me. Later I was fortunate to meet and work
with her at Stanford University during her visits. Through many discussions, she
guided me through different ideas, research topics, and papers. Dr. Jain introduced
me to network theory, and showed me pioneering result in the field. Conversations
with Dr. Jain were always inspiring. Dr. Yanofsky is one of my favorite professors
during the first 2-year study of fundamentals in computer science. As someone who
did not study computer science before, I am truly grateful for the knowledge he taught
me.
I also want to thank the Graduate Center of CUNY for awarding me the Enhanced
Chancellor’s Fellowship that supported my doctoral studies. I am grateful that our
former department chair, Dr. Theodore Brown admitted me to the program, and that
Dr. Robert Haralick continued supporting me as the new chair. Lots of thanks go
vi
to Lina Garcia and Dilvania Rodriguez for all their amazing assistance with various
administrative matters.
Last but not the least, to my love, my best friend, Milinda. I am forever in-debt
of his support.
vii
To Milinda and Neo . . .
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Organization of the Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Background 5
2.1 Rational Choice Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1 The Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.2 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Social Outliers - Autism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.2 Theory of Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.3 The Affective Foundation Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.4 Mirror Neurons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.1 Sender-Receiver Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.2 The Lewis-Skyrms Signaling Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.3 Information in ‘Signals’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4 Social Software: From Social Procedure to Homo Sociologicus . . . . 32
2.5 The Jigsaw Puzzle: in Search of Homo Sociologicus . . . . . . . . . . 33
viii
CONTENTS ix
3 Knowledge and Epistemic Logic 36
3.1 Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2 Formal Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3 Friends’ Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.4 Language Splitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4.1 P Axioms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4 Network Theory 42
4.1 Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2 Basic Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.3 The Scale-Free Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5 Expert Influence 51
5.1 Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.2 Examples of Expert Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.3 Computation Complexity of Experts Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6 Coordination Under Influence 57
6.1 Influence and Coordination in Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6.2 Expected Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.3 Belief Conflict and Coordination Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
6.4 Different Types of Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
7 Simulating Social Influence 67
7.1 Watts-Strogatz Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
7.2 Barabási-Albert Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8 Summary 77
8.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77




2.1 Revere 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.1 Influence Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
xi
List of Figures
3.1 An example of an unstable structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.1 Google went down for millions of users due to a routing leak from an
Indian ISP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2 Image from Network Science by Albert-László Barabási . . . . . . . . 43
4.3 Connected and Disconnected Networks [10] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.4 The incoming and outgoing degree distribution of the WWW from [2] 48
4.5 A Poisson function compared with a power-law function with γ = 2.1.
Both have 〈k〉 = 10. [10] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.6 Same two functions as above shown on a log-log plot. [10] . . . . . . . 50
4.7 A scale-free network with 〈k〉 = 3 [10] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.1 Example 1: Single Expert - beginning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.2 Example 1: Single Expert - during . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.3 Example 1: Single Expert - end . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.4 Example 2 (Two Experts) - beginning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.5 Example 2 - end the influence for agent b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6.1 Conflicting Influence 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6.2 Influence in a complete graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.3 Influence in a ring graph with 4 agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.4 Influence in a ring graph with 5 agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
xii
LIST OF FIGURES xiii
6.5 Influence in a star graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
7.1 WS Network - 1 - initial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7.2 WS Network - 1 - final . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
7.3 WS Network - 1 - history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
7.4 WS Network - 2 - initial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
7.5 WS Network - 2 - final . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
7.6 WS Network - 2 - history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.7 BA Network - 1 - initial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7.8 BA Network - 1 - final . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
7.9 BA Network - 1 - history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
7.10 BA Network - 2 - initial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7.11 BA Network - 2 - final . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7.12 BA Network - 2 - history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Chapter 1
Introduction
What is a social man (homo sociologicus)?
With this question in mind, this dissertation starts with the journey taken in
the empirical fields such as experimental economics and experimental psychology.
Later it extended to theoretical and philosophical areas on the related topics of homo
sociologicus, contrasting with homo economicus 1.
The idea of homo economicus was originated by the prominent 19th-century scholar,
John Stuart Mill [70]. In his work in 1836 [50], “...does not treat the whole of man’s
nature as modified by the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society...”.
Such a self-interested idea of man is also associated with the founding father of modern
economics, Adam Smith, in his famous work ‘The Wealth of Nations [89]’. He wrote:
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest”. Later in 1881, Edgeworth
even endorsed the idea as “the first principle of Economics” [21]. The idea of homo
economicus has been a major influence on economic theories and models ever since [85].
However, Sen points out the absurdity of such an idea in his widely cited paper,
“Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory” in
1977 [85]. He gives an amusing example to illustrate the problem of Homo Economicus
1Social human and Economic human respectively
1
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assumption:
“Where is the railway station?” he asks me. “There,” I say, pointing
at the post office, “and would you please post this letter for me on the
way?” “Yes,” he says, determined to open the envelope and check whether
it contains something valuable.
While Sen agrees with Edgeworth’s first principle in a strictly defined context, he also
points out that we cannot forgo the complex psychological issues beneath choices and
calls for “actually testing”, which was indeed done by experimental economists years
later. With the flourishing of behavioral and experimental economics, researchers are
able to bring a vast amount of data on the table to show that in many situations
people do not just act on self-interest [74] [25]. The most notable publication, which is
cited 1238 times to this date since 2001, is “In search of homo economicus: behavioral
experiments in 15 small-scale societies” [35]. Their results not only show the same
kind of deviation from the predications based on the homo economicus assumption,
but also show that economic decisions are closely related to social/group activities.
Around the same period, a group of economists started calling for defining social
preferences [24] [23].
It is clear that the homo economicus assumption works only within a tightly
restricted economic context. But what about homo sociologicus? The term was
introduced by German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf in 1958 [17]. Here we borrow this
term and examine what it means to be a social man within economic theories and
framework. There is already a branch of studies in decision theory focusing on social
procedures and decision making in groups [69] [80]. However, what we want to focus
on is the individual level of decision making with the assumption of a social man.
Any topics related to society are almost guaranteed to be interdisciplinary studies,
so is this one. We first look at some related empirical results from experimental
economics, namely from Public Goods Game (PGG) and Ultimatum Game (UG).
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Both games have social elements and in both empirical results deviate from the
theoretical predictions. Then we review the fundamentals of classic rational choice
theory, which serve as our theoretical foundation in economics. Inevitably, when
we study real human decision making, we come across bounded rationality [88],
which assumes limited computational power of real people and limited information
accessibility. So what are the consequences of bounded rationality in a social man?
We would like to know how rationality is bounded socially as in the results found
by Bowles at el in [35]. We want to find out whether there are social signals that
help decision makers make social-related decisions. Therefore we dig deeper to review
the literature for signals. Another important and related area is the psychology of
reasoning, which gives firm understanding of rationality. In this area, we also review
the literature on one particular kind of subject, autistic people, who are considered to
have relatively low social intelligence. However, some recent publications 2 [31] [77]
show that autistic people can reason about social situations, only not in the form of
what normal people possess.
After reviewing in these fields, it is clear that we are homo sociologicus. Our lives
are not purely driven by individual motives. We have group identity and behaviors.
We also make group decisions. However what can we, computer scientists, do to
further the understanding of the concept of homo sociologicus?
With these empirical studies in the background, let us get back to computational
side. We review dynamic epistemic logic including its latest development on friends’
influence in a network based community. In additionally, we review some technical
work from Parikh [62] that allows multiple languages in belief changes. We also review
some concepts in network science.
Only after much of the reviewing and exploring, we are ready to suggest a system
2In fact, [31] is written by two highly autistic people who overcome their autism to a great extend.
One of them is the famous autistic professor Temple Grandin. She described, in the book, how social
rules did not come naturally to her. However, she can reason about social rules.
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which we believe can accommodate many of the issues in understanding a social
person.
We are particularly interested in revisable and actionable social knowledge/belief
that leads to a large group action. Instead of centralized coordination, a bottom-up
approach is our focus. We explore multiple methods of belief revision in social networks.
Such belief revision in groups represents social influence and power to some degree.
Both influence from friends and from experts are explained.
We define an intuitive concept of expected influence of a group. When different
influence sources are suggesting conflicting actions, agents could make strategic
decisions by analyzing expected influence of different subgroups. We then show some
properties of expected influence in different network structures. We also simulate the
strategic influence emerging in small-world networks which represents many real world
networks.
1.1 Organization of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 presents reviews of various theories as background, including rational choice
theory, autism, signaling. Chapter 3 illustrates the contribution to the topic of social
issues from computer science. We present some work in social software, dynamic
epistemic logic and network science. We introduce our concept of Expert Influence in
Chapter 4. Chapter 5 explains how group belief revision can lead to group actions by




2.1 Rational Choice Theory
2.1.1 The Theory
This part of review is mostly following the related topics in Lecture Notes in Microe-
conomic Theory by Ariel Rubinstein [75].
Preferences
We define that a variety of options1 as a finite set X. We then further define a binary
relation % that is a collection of ordered pairs of elements from X. For example, when
x, y ∈ X, we can have (x, y) ∈%, which can also be denoted as x % y. It means option
x is seen at least as good as option y.
This binary relation also includes two additional definitions: one is symmetric,
indifferent: ∼, and the other is asymmetric strictly better : . For two elements
x, y ∈ X, x ∼ y ⇔ [(x % y) and (y % x)]. While x  y ⇔ [(x % y) but not (y % x)].
We now introduce two Axioms, Completeness and Transitivity.
1In this chapter, we use ‘options’ interchangeably with ‘alternatives’.
5
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Completeness For any two options x, y ∈ X, x % y or y % x.
This axiom says that a decision maker can always choose between two options.
Although considering the definition of the binary relation ‘%’ and its related definitions,
it is clear that the completeness axiom allows three situations for any two options.
First, when x  y, it means that the decision maker always chooses option x over y.
Similarly, the second situation is when y  x, the decision maker chooses y. The last
situation is when x ∼ y, which means the decision maker chooses x and y at random2.
Transitivity For any three options x, y, z ∈ X, if (x % y and y % z), then x % z.
This axiom prevents cyclical preferences in both individual and group decision
making situations.
Utility
When we compare two options x, y ∈ X, we often say that we prefer one of them. For
example, ‘I prefer higher grades’. This can be written in following form:
x % y if V (x) ≥ V (y)
Here V : X → R is a function that assigns a real number to each element in
X. In our example of grades, it has a clear numerical representation. But we also
want to represent sets of options that do not have clear numerical evaluation. For
example, Jill prefers Thai food over Japanese food because she likes spicy food, i.e.
the spicier food has a higher value to her. Ideally we want to define a function
U : X → R that represents the binary relation % if for any two elements x, y ∈ X,
x % y ⇔ U(x) ≥ U(y). We call this function a utility function.
To show the existence of such utility function, we will look into two situations,
namely when X is finite, and when X is continuous [71].
2As how Gilboa put it in his book ‘Rational Choice’ [29].
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Finite Space When the set X is finite, a utility function that represents % rela-
tionship always exists. To prove that, we can first show that any subset of X has a
minimal element3 through induction on the size of subsets given that X is complete
and transitive. Then we can prove following proposition [75].
Proposition 2.1.1: For a finite set X, the binary relation %⊆ X×X that is complete
and transitive, has a utility representation with natural numbers. 
Proof. Given a finite set X, we can define X1 as a subset of X which contains all the
minimal elements of X. Then we further define X2 as a subset of X −X1 with all
the minimal elements in X − X1. We can keep constructing such minimal subsets
till we have X = X1 ∪ X2 ∪ X3 . . . Xk, and k ≤ |X|. We then define U(x) = k
if x ∈ Xk. Further more, when a % b and a, b ∈ X, we know U(a) > U(b) and
a 6∈ X1 ∪X2 ∪X3 . . . XU(b). When a  b, U(a) = U(b). 
Continuous Space Often in economics the set X is set to be an infinite subset of
a Euclidean space, Rn. We want to show that often there is a utility representation
in such a case too. Continuity requires that for two options a, b ∈ X, if a is strictly
preferred over b, then the “neighboring” elements around a should be preferred over
the “neighboring” elements around b. To formalize this, we will start with some
definitions [75].
Definition 2.1.2: Let a be an element in X. For the set of all points that have
distance less than r (r > 0) from a, we call it a ball around a, and denote it as
Ball(a, r). ♦
Definition 2.1.3 (Continuous a): We call a preference relationship % on X con-
tinuous if whenever a  b, there are balls Ba and Bb such that x  y for all x ∈ Ba
and y ∈ Bb. ♦
3Or minimal elements, if they are equivalent.
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Definition 2.1.4 (Continuous b): We call a preference relationship % on X con-
tinuous when the set {(x, y)|x % y} ⊆ X ×X is a closed set. In other words, for all
n and an, bn ∈ X such that an → a and bn → b, and an ≥ bn, we have a % b ♦
A preference relation % on X satisfies ‘Continuous a’ if and only if it satisfies
‘Continuous b’.
Debreu [19] proved a famous theorem that pushes a step further.
Theorem 2.1.5 (Debreu’s Theorem): For a continuous preference relationship %
on X, there exists a continuous utility function U(x) : X → R. 
Choice
Both utility functions and preference relations are just the mental attitude of a person
towards a set of options. However, they do not explain how that person actually
makes a choice in a real life situation. A person can think of a preference ordering
for different options, but it does not necessarily say that he would make a choice
accordingly in a real decision problem. Therefore we need to introduce the definition
of choice function. Before that we will first look at some preliminary definitions.
We will look at the set of possible alternatives X again, in which any non-empty
subset A of X could be a choice problem. Any member x ∈ A is a choice. In
some situations, the decision maker considers relevant choice problems. We pair the
collection of choice problems, D ⊆ X, with X, and call (X,D) a context. When a
context is given, for each particular problem A ⊆ D, a choice function C(A) outputs
a unique element from A that is the choice of the problem.
Since this chapter is about rational choice theory, we shall discuss what kind of
behaviors are considered rational within this theory. Roughly speaking, we consider a
decision maker rational when he has a preference relation % on the set of alternatives
X, and facing a choice problem A in context D, he chooses an optimal element in A.
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In other words, we call a choice function C rationalizable when C(A) = C%(A) for any
A in the domain of C.
Next, we will further review an important condition for rationalizable choice
functions: condition α by Sen [84], which is also referred to as Chernoff’s condition [15].
Condition α Given two problems A and B, both in context D, we say that a choice
function C satisfies condition α, if A ⊃ B and C(B) ∈ A, then C(A) = C(B). We
define C% as a choice function that always outputs a single most preferred element in
X given a preference relation %. C% satisfies condition α.
Sometimes Condition α is also called “independence of irrelevant alternatives” and
was first introduced by Arrow [6] and Nash [52]. A different way to state it would be:
if an alternative x ∈ B chosen is an element of B, then x must be chosen from A.
Dutch Book Arguments Dutch Book Arguments state that anyone who does not
try to maximize a preference relation will endure a loss. In economics, a decision
maker can be Dutch-booked if he or she has intransitive preferences. For example,
given three alternative values to choose from: A, B, and C, the decision maker, say
Tom, has the following preference: A  B, B  C, but C  A. Then someone can
take advantage of him by first selling A to Tom for B + ε; then selling B to Tom for
C + ε; then selling C to Tom for A+ ε. At the end, Tom has paid 3ε with nothing in
return.
Notes on ‘Alternatives’ When we talked about Dutch Book Argument, we re-
vealed an irrational choosing behavior that preserves intransitive preferences on a set
of alternatives. In some situations, the violation of rationality is due to inaccurate or
changing specification of alternatives. Now we are going to review a famous dinner
example from Luce and Raiffa 1957 [48]. In a restaurant, a customer chooses chicken
from the menu with only steak tartare and chicken. At the same time, he chooses
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steak tartare from the menu with steak tartare, chicken and frog legs. It looks like
this customer violates the condition α, hence we could consider him irrational with
his choices. However, it is possible that he realized the fact that the second menu
with the frog legs indicates a high level of cooking skills. Making a steak tartare also
requires high level of cooking skills. Following such reasoning, you may consider that
this customer is actually not that irrational, but actually smart. Rubinstein adds
this paragraph to remind us that sometimes the same set of alternatives can have a
different meaning.
We also should realize the particular reasoning of this customer also implies another
condition: he is a new customer. That means even though he has access to his own
preferences, he does not have full information about the choices that he could make in
this particular restaurant.
In Sen’s paper [86], he also discusses the problem of internal consistency.
Choice Functions We will continue the definition of choice functions. So far, the
functions we discussed have only one solution to every choice problem. It is certainly
possible that given a preference relation and a choice problem, there are more than one
optimal solutions. Therefore we will explain a further fine-grained definition: choice
correspondence.
Given a choice problem A, C(A) is a non-empty subset of A. It is obvious that
the decision maker has to select one element from C(A). Basically C(A) is set of
equivalent optimal choices he could select from.
The weak Axiom of Revealed Preference Samuelson [87] originated the revealed
preference approach in 1938 [78]. It was also proposed by Houthakker [39] and by
von Neumann and Morgenstern [94]. Arrow adapted it to set-valued choice functions
in [7]. Sen provides a systematic treatment of the axiomatic structure of the theory of
revealed preference in [87]. Note: xPy is equivalent to our earlier notation: x  y.
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Sen defines xP̃y as x is chosen while y is available but rejected.
Definition 2.1.6: For any x, y ∈ X, we say x is indirectly revealed preferred
to y, denoted as xP ∗y, if only if there is a sequence zi, i = 0, ..., n, and z1 = x and
zn = y, such that for all i, zi−1P̃ zi. ♦
Definition 2.1.7: For any x, y ∈ X, we say x is indirectly revealed preferred to
y in the wide sense, denoted as xWy, if only if there is a sequence zi, i = 0, ..., n,
and z1 = x and zn = y, such that for all 4 i, zi−1Rzi . ♦
For all x, y ∈ X, we have the following axioms [75]:
1. Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP): If xP̃y, then not yRx.
2. Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP): If xP ∗y, then not yRx.
3. Strong Congruence Axiom (SCA): If xWy, then for any non-empty subset
B in choice problem A such that y ∈ C(B) and x ∈ B, x must also belong to
C(B).
4. Weak Congruence Axiom (WCA): If xRy, then for any B in A such that
y ∈ C(B) and x ∈ B, x must also belong to C(B).
After showing the equivalence of all four axioms mentioned above in [87], Sen
raises two important questions: (1) Are the rationality axioms to be used only after
stipulating them to be true? (2) Are there reasons to expect that some of the rationality
axioms will tend to be satisfied in choices over “budget sets” but not for other choices?
Expected Utility
So far in our description of rational choice theory, we assumed that the decision maker
has the information about available options and outcome of the choice. However
4xRy is equivalent to our earlier notation: x % y.
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in reality, we often do not have exact information about the outcome, and face
risks or uncertainties. That is the relationship between actions and outcome is not
deterministic.
This aspect is especially crucial for this dissertation, since ultimately we want
to define choices made in a social environment that consists of many people. Then
uncertainty is inevitable. Expected Utility Hypothesis, an idea, which goes as far
as 1738 from Daniel Bernoulli [12], provides an important view of how to model
uncertainty. In the paper, he wrote:
“Somehow a very poor fellow obtains a lottery ticket that will yield
with equal probability either nothing or twenty thousand ducats5. Will
this man evaluate his chance of winning at ten thousand ducats? Would
he not be ill-advised to sell this lottery ticket for nine thousand ducats?
To me it seems that the answer is in the negative. On the other hand I
am inclined to believe that a rich man would be ill-advised to refuse to
buy the lottery ticket for nine thousand ducats.”
“...the determination of the value of an item must not be based on its
price, but rather on the utility it yields. The price of the item is dependent
only on the thing itself and is equal for everyone; the utility, however,
is dependent on the particular circumstances of the person making the
estimate. Thus there is no doubt that a gain of one thousand ducats is
more significant to a pauper than to a rich man though both gain the
same amount.”
“If the utility of each possible profit expectation is multiplied by the
number of ways in which it can occur, and we then divide the sum of
these products by the total number of possible cases, a mean utility [moral
expectation] will be obtained, and the profit which corresponds to this
5A ducat was a standard gold coin throughout Europe.
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utility will equal the value of the risk in question.”
Bernoulli pointed out the problem of focusing only on monetary term and suggested
to use expected utility instead. He also suggested to use logarithm to calculate the
utility.
In 1944, Von Neumann and Morgenstern provide a formula in their book Theory
of Games and Economic Behavior [94]. Later in 1954 [81], Savage introduced an
alternative framework, subjective expected utility that was followed by the work from
Aumann and Anscombe [5].
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Theorem Before we review the Von Neumann-
Morgenstern Utility Theorem (vNM Theorem), we shall explain some preliminary
concepts that extend naturally to the context of uncertainty6. In the earlier section,
we have defined X as a set of options. Here we will be more precise, and define X to
be a set of outcomes. The binary relation % on X is the same as how we introduced
preference. x1 % x2 indicates that x1 is weakly preferred to x2, and  indicates strict
preference while ∼ indicates the indifference between the two outcome. A lottery on
X is a probability distribution: [p1 : x1; p2 : x2; p3 : x3; ...; pn : xn]. In addition, we
have: ∑ni=1 pi = 1 and all pi ≥ 0.
In the following paragraphs, we will explain the six axioms that are stated by
Von Neumann and Morgenstern [94]: completeness, transitivity, substitutability,
monotonicity, continuity, and decomposability.
Axioms We have introduced the first two axioms (completeness and transitivity)
earlier. Therefore we will just simply state them here.
Completeness: ∀x1, x2 ∈ X, x1  x2; or x2  x1; or x1 ∼ x2
Transitivity: ∀x1, x2, x3 ∈ X, x1 % x2 and x2 % x3 ⇒ x1 % x3
6For the convenience of readers, we will repeat some basic definition of preference that were
introduced earlier.
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Substitutability: If two outcomes are indifferent for a decision maker, then he is
also indifferent between the two lotteries that contain the outcomes separately. To
put it formally: Given x1 ∼ x2, [p : x1; p3 : x3; ...; pn : xn] ∼ [p : x2; p3 : x3; ...; pn : xn],
where p+∑ni=3 pi = 1. In other words, the outcome x1 can be substituted with x2.
Monotonicity: For all x1, x2 ∈ X, x1  x2 and 1 ≥ p > q ≥ 0 ⇒ [p : x1; 1− p :
x2]  [q : x1; 1− q : x2]
Continuity: For all x1, x2, x3 ∈ X, x1  x2 and x2  x3 ⇒ ∃p ∈ [0, 1] such that
x2 ∼ [p : x1; 1− p : x3]
Decomposability: We denote Plj(xi) as the probability that xi is selected by
lottery lj. The axiom states that if we have two lotteries l1 and l2 over X, and
Pl1(xi) = Pl2(xi) for all xi ∈ X, then l1 ∼ l2.
An example could be following:
l1 = [0.7 : x1; 0.3 : [0.3 : x1; 0.7 : x2]]
l2 = [0.79 : x1; 0.21 : x2; 0 : x3]
According to decomposability axiom, l1 ∼ l2.
vNM Theorem
Theorem 2.1.8: When a binary preference relation % on a set of outcomes X satisfies
completeness, transitivity, substitutability, monotonicity, continuity and decomposabil-
ity, a utility function u exists and fulfills the following two properties:
u(x1) ≥ u(x2) if only if x1 % x2
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2.1.2 Empirical Results
As we discussed in the introduction, the idea of homo economicus dated as far back
as 1836. Sen has written a theoretical objection to the idea and argued about the
exact context in which the idea might work. At the same time, the homo economicus
assumption was nurturing another branch of research in economics: game theory,
which emerged naturally from rational choice theory, and was heavily tested through
experimental economics. Although the first reported experiment was done in 1930 by
Thurstone, it was not till mid 90’s that experimental economics reached its prime [73].
Through experiments, economists found many deviations in the real world results
from the theory. Their initial conclusion was that real humans are not rational.
There is one particular kind of games in which subjects often behave ‘irrationally’
during experiments. Usually, this kind of game has social factors in the process. The
social factors are represented in two different types of scenarios. First type is the
number of players. For example, in public goods game, there are often more than 2
players. A second type is the implicit social aspect, such as in ultimatum games. In
fact, the deviations of the experimental results in both games bring us back to our
goal: in search of homo sociologicus. The crucial question we want to ask is: are the
subjects really just being irrational or do our models need to be adapted towards the
social assumption? Clearly we are in favor of the latter view. So are Bowles et al [35].
They have conducted a few games with social elements in 15 small-scale societies
and show that the deviations are systematic. People are not making random social
decisions. But the way they make such decisions is closely related to their day to day
activities, which are shared by the social members.
Reading through such empirical results gives us both motivation and data for
building new rational choice models with considerations of social aspects.
In this chapter, we will review literature in both public goods game and ultimatum
game. We are going to explain the basic ideas and procedures of the two games, the
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theoretical predictions, and the empirical results.
Public Goods Game
The theory of public goods is important for economists, policy makers and international
organizations. It provides an insight into market failures, e.g. their mechanism,
consumers’ and suppliers’ incentives, which are all essential for a well-functioning
society. The rise of international governance, like IMF, World Bank, and UN, tells
the awareness of the need of public goods. Besides governments and sociologists,
economists are also interested in public goods. Do people treat public goods the same
as private goods? What do they do when there is a conflict of interests between public
and private goods? In 1980, Mas-Colell [49] published his mathematical approach to
public goods theory. In the experiments, subjects have to make decisions about their
public account and private account 7. Such experiments were conducted by different
researchers but in one-shot form as Schneider and his co-authors did [82]. Isaac and
his colleagues tried a new experiment [40] with the possibility of repetition. We will
call their game the basic game in this dissertation. The details of the experiment are
explained in the following subsections.
The basic game Public goods experiments have studied standard voluntary contri-
bution mechanisms where groups have a choice to invest in a private or a common
account. The private account gives the subject a return of the exact amount invested
in it, while the common account gives each group member a marginal per capita return
(MPCR) 8. The higher the contribution into the common account, the higher the
group payoff. Results have shown that contributions start very high and then decrease
over time [40]. Also, since the decision process is repeated, participants become more
experienced and free riding becomes a strategy, especially when the MPCR is low [18].
7Details explained in section 3.1.1.
8A basic example is explained following paragraphs: Basic Idea, Procedure, and Payoff determina-
tion.
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Hence, there exists this social dilemma.
To alleviate the problem of free riding and contribution decreases, studies have
implemented different mechanisms to drive the contributions higher. In this section,
we will look at three pairs of such variations that are particularly interesting for
social concerns, namely punishment versus reward, one versus multiple punishers, and
strangers versus partners.
Now let us first look at the most basic game. Isaac and his colleagues conducted 9
different experiments for the paper. We will not explain each one of them in detail,
but take the essence of these experiments and tailor our ‘basic game’ for theoretical
analysis.
Basic Idea A group of subjects who participate in this experiment have to make
some decisions on their contribution to a public account, and later their total private
benefit is determined by a pre-set function. No communication is allowed during the
whole experiment.
Procedure Each participant receives an endowment y at each round. He has to
decide how much of y he is willing to contribute to the public account. Then after the
experimenter’s calculation with the payoff function, the participant is informed about
his own total payoff of the round. The game is repeated for t rounds.
Payoff determination We assume the following payoff function at round t for
participant i, who contributed gti to the public account, and there are n participants
in total:




Note: 1/n < a < 1. The total payoff for participant i is just simply: ∑t1 πti .
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Theory and Prediction In this subsection, we are mainly looking at the basic
game and analyzing it from a game theoretical point of view. First of all, we have to
assume that the following prediction is for the selfish and rational subjects. There are
many papers written about altruistic subjects. One of the earliest such proposals was
from Andreoni [4].
With that assumption, a subject would behave in such a way to maximize his
payoff πi in each round of the basic game. Looking at the payoff function mentioned
before, we clearly see δπi
δgi
= −1 + a. Given 1/n < a < 1, we know −1 + a < 0.
Therefore the subject would never contribute to the public account, i.e. gi = 0. 9
Example Let us look at a experimental example of a Public Goods game. A group of
4 subjects participate in the game. At each round, everyone receives 20 units of initial
endowment. They have to decide how much of the endowment, they want to contribute
into private and public accounts respectively. A subject can choose to keep all the
units for himself, i.e. to keep them in his private account. Then this particular round,
his compensation is 20 units. If all the subjects choose to give all units to the public
account, each of them will get πi = y − gi + a
∑n
j=1 gj = 20− 20 + 0.5× (20× 4) = 40
assuming a = 0.5.
There are 5 rounds of decisions that they have to make. They can decide to keep
all the units in all 5 rounds, in which case their total compensation will be 20×5 = 100
units. If all the subjects decide to contribute all the units to the public account in all
5 rounds, then they each can get 40 ∗ 5 = 200, which is twice as much as if they all
refuse to contribute. However, subjects can also freeload on others’ contribution. For
example, if all but one subject contribute all units to the public account. Then at
each round, this freeloader can get 20− 0 + 0.5(3 ∗ 20) = 50 units. If this happens at
every round, then at the end, he gets 50 ∗ 5 = 250 units, which is more than if they
9Now we are just looking at the game as if it’s one-short game, because later in related paper
there are analysis of repeated game.
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all contribute and get 200 units at the end.
Variations As we have mentioned before, there are many different variations of the
public goods game. Here we only focus on some of the variations, which are related to
our design.
Punishment vs. Reward To many people’s surprise, when reward option is given,
it actually does not work as well as punishment. In this case we are able to explain
the experimental results from game theoretical perspective.
In Fehr and Gächter’s paper [26] that was influenced by [55], the game with
punishment was designed in two stages. The first stage was similar to ‘the basic
game’. During the second stage, the participants had opportunities to punish other
participants at some cost. It turned out that with punishment, the overall contribution
to the public account improved in comparison with the game without the punishment.
Sefton, Shupp and Walker wrote a paper in 2007 about the effect of rewards
and sanctions10 [83]. The experiment with rewards has similar structure as the
experiment with punishments in Fehr and Gächter’s paper. The rewards are costly
just as punishment is costly, i.e. the rewards are not free. Game theoretically speaking,
the punishment creates big threat to the free-riders, even without real punishment.
However, in the games with rewards, it works differently. If there are expectations of
rewards among the participants, then there have to be rewards, otherwise the existence
of possibility of being rewarded would actually dis-encourage the high contributors.
Indeed Sefton, Shupp and Walker found such a result [83].
One punisher v.s. Multiple punishers In order to understand the effects of
different punishment structures, O’Gorman et al (2009) [54] have implemented an
experiment with three different conditions that have no punisher, one punisher and
10Sanctions here are technically the same as punishments in Fehr and Gächter’s paper.
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all punishers respectively. Their punishment system was based on a 1 : 3 ratio of the
cost of punishing for the punisher to the cost for the target. This ratio facilitated in
bringing the group with a single punisher to contribute at high levels and produce
a larger profit than the group with all being punishers. Profits were larger in the
one punisher case because punishment costs were small and punishment was more
coordinated, thus reducing inefficient loss. This shows that uncoordinated punishments
made by many people will cause inefficiency and unnecessary losses.
Strangers vs. Partners It is already game theoretically surprising to find that
people punish free-riders at their own cost. Because given the fact that participants
know how many rounds there are, one could always benefit more than the others
deviating, i.e. contribute low or 0 at the last round 11. Applying backward induction,
a rational participant should never contribute anything from the start. There are
people who apply backward induction in a common real life situation. However, Fehr
and Gächter pushed it even further. They assigned the group members randomly for
each round so that participants are ‘strangers’ to each other. Then there is clearly no
future gain by punish someone, because one cannot even ‘educate’ the free-riders to
contribute more in the future round. However, people still punish in this setting [26].
12
Ultimatum Game
Ultimatum game(UG) is a widely experimented and considered as ‘one of the simplest’
games in experimental game theory. Güth, Scmittberger and Schwarze first wrote an
experimental analysis of this kind of take-it-or-leave-it game in 1982 [33].
The experimental results often deviate from the game theoretical prediction. Game
theoretically speaking, the proposer should claim as much as possible for himself, while
11From game theoretical point of view, it should be 0, in order to maximize the gain.
12In next subsetion more detailed the analysis of the variations is provided.
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the responder should not reject any non-zero offers for him/her. However in reality,
people tend to propose much more for the responders, and responders reject offers
under 30% of the total share. One stream of publication, esp. in neuro-economics,
tends to claim that emotional activation is the main reason for such a result [79] [93].
Although such a simple claim could not give detailed explanation on cross-cultural
results found by Bowles et al [35]. In [35], the experiments run in 15 small-scaled
rather primitive societies reveal some systematic deviations from the game theoretical
results across culture. It indicates a potential sophisticated mechanism beneath the
behavior in the simple game.
2.2 Social Outliers - Autism
They reveal interesting facts about reasoning, epistemology, more importantly in
relation with social situation.
2.2.1 Introduction
People with autism belong to a special group. They could have average intelligence
or higher in some cases, but show some very specific deficits. The most obvious one
is their asocial tendency. It was Kanner who started recording a special condition,
autism, among children in 1938 and published it in 1943 [42]. Later Rutter [76]
summarized three key features of this condition: (1) impaired social development; (2)
delayed linguistic development; (3) insistence on sameness. All three prior features
can be noticeable as early as 30 months old.
Autistic children are often inaccessible not only because of their delayed develop-
ment in languages, but also because of the absence of interest in any social interaction.
They often preoccupy themselves with repetitive movements, such as laying down
little objects endlessly. They usually do not have pretense play [44], which is common
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with normal children. Autistic children can be violent and have rages. All these traits
make it very hard for their parents and people around. Some people with autism have
lifelong institutionalization.
However there is another side of the autistic condition, savant talent, which is often
ignored or overlooked by the parents and researchers13. Many people with autism
have amazing abilities [91] [92]. Many are particularly good with jigsaw puzzles. Some
have perfect pitch and can play tunes after hearing them just once. Some have perfect
memory of all events as early as several months after they were born. These abilities
give important cues of the autism condition as well as the deficits.
Autism is certainly an intriguing condition. Every individual with autism has an
unique set of behaviors. However, the main features which we mentioned above can
be reliably identified. In the 80s, it was considered a rare condition which happens 4
in every 10,000 children. However, the frequency has increased dramatically over the
decades. According to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, it is affecting 1 in
every 88 children in the U.S. Understanding the matter seems urgently important.
2.2.2 Theory of Mind
Theory of mind, termed by Premack and Woodruff (1978), seems to be a particularly
human ability. This theory describes how humans generally can think about what
other people know, believe, and feel. Some researchers, such as Baron-Cohen, Leslie
and Uta Frith, have linked the deficit in autism with lack of theory of mind.
Leslie [44] argues that pretense is part of the origins of ‘theory of mind’ and
develops a meta-representational mechanism to illustrate it. In this section, we will
first go through the basics of his theory and then explain its connection with autism.
Children of age two or older seem to have a more ‘sophisticated’ play: pretense play,
e.g. holding a banana and pretending it is a phone. Such ability is a major development
13A search for “autism” on Google Scholar gives 426,000 results; while for “Autism Savant” it gives
only 3,560 results. There is not enough research on this particular group.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 23
because it reveals not only children’s ability of handling distorted reality but also
the beginning of a capacity for meta-representation which is seen, by Leslie, as the
crucial ingredient for a theory of mind. Firstly Leslie [44] excludes some possibilities
which appear to be pretense play, such as acting in error and functional play. Then he
further defines three fundamental forms of pretense: object substitution, attribution
of pretend properties, and imaginary objects. In other words, any one (or more) of
the following situations [44] would make a play pretense play: a) object substitution:
if an object is made to stand for another; b) attribution of pretend properties: a
certain unreal property is used for a particular object; c) imaginary objects: there are
imaginary objects. Leslie continues with definitions of primary representation, which is
the first basic representational capacity for infants, and representational abuse which
affects all three kinds of pretense and handles some relationships between two primary
representation. In order to understand the pretense in others, a child would need a
capacity for meta-representation. A major feature of the pretense theory is that it
actually represents the beginning of a capacity to understand cognition itself, which
is a fundamental idea in the theory of mind. Leslie also explains the isomorphism
between the three types of pretense and the logical properties of sentences containing
mental state terms. In the article, he gives a model for pretense as well: Decoupling
Model. There are three major components in the model: 1) the perceptual processes 2)
central cognitive systems 3) the decoupler. The decoupler can be further divided into
three parts: the expression raiser, the manipulator and the interpreter. The decoupler
is involved when a meta-representation is needed. Besides the detailed explanation
of how the model works in a pretense play, Leslie also explains the gap between the
two-year-old pretenders and four-year-old children who can pass the false-belief test
which indicate the mastery of theory of mind.
Children with autism are impaired in pretend play (Baron-Cohen 1987; Rutter
1978; Sigman and Ungerer 1981). With the model from Leslie’s article, it is possible to
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connect this symptom to the social impairment. Leslie concludes that Autistic children
lack the ability in both primitive forms (pretense) and advanced forms (false-belief
test) because of the impairment in their decoupling ability.
2.2.3 The Affective Foundation Theory
For another group of researchers14, the symptoms in autism are not just cognitive, but
also emotional. For example, it is very difficult for autistic children to develop close
emotional relationships with people, even with their parents. Hobson [37] believes
that understanding such impairment in emotional development is also crucial for
understanding the autism condition as a whole. In fact, he argues further that the
cognitive and language abnormalities in autism are consequences of the emotional
impairment. In his opinion, ‘infants are biologically prewired to relate to people in ways
that are special to people, and it is through the experience of reciprocal, affectively
patterned interpersonal contact that a young child comes to apprehend and eventually
conceptualize the nature of persons with mental life’ [37](p.104) The affect from other
people directed toward objects or events is a special source of information. Through
observing this type of information, young children come to understand self. Hobson
believes that his process is a required foundation even for symbolic development. He
applies his model to Autistic children, and explains that the difficulty in engaging
affective states with others is the origin of the problem.
Then he also ran some experiments [38] which tested their ability to recognize
emotion and personal identity. The control group in these experiments are non-Autistic
retarded children. In the first experiment, the subjects have to complete some tasks in
which two types of faces are presented. The first type is used to observe subjects’ ability
of identifying faces, while the second type is to observe their ability of recognizing
emotion. Regarding the first type, there were no statistical difference between two
14Here we will just focus on one, Hobson.
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groups of subjects. However, the non-Autistic retarded children are better when the
emotion is involved. A second experiment was testing their ability of identifying
upside-down faces. The results revealed that Autistic children were better at matching
both ‘identity’ and ‘emotion’ in upside-down faces.
The experiments seem to fit with Hobson’s theory that Autistic children’s impair-
ment is in affective connections.
2.2.4 Mirror Neurons
Starting from late 90’s, another line of research from neuroscience has been offering
an alternative explanation on autism, especially on social impairment. One of the
most representative work is from Gallese and his colleagues [28] [27] [98]. They
claim that the newly discovered mirror neurons (MNs) have profound implication in
understanding theory of mind, and hence in understanding of social impairment in
autism.
MNs were first discovered in the macaque monkey premotor cortex. During the
experiments, MNs respond in following two situations [28]: first, when a particular
action is performed by the recorded monkey; second, when the same action performed
by another monkey is observed. In [28], Gallese and Goldman further explain the mirror
system in humans. The MNs cannot be directly studied in humans but experiments
with alternative approaches have shown strong evidence for a system similar to what
is discovered in monkeys. The paper [28] proposes that MNs are an important base
for mind-reading process or at least a precursor. This claim supports a second type of
model of theory of mind: a simulation based model, compared with the theory based
model proposed by Baron-Cohen and his colleagues which we had looked at in an
earlier section. Simulation based model suggests that when people ‘read’ others’ minds,
they do not need to have a theory of all the psychological inferences, instead they just
put themselves in others’ shoes to simulate the situation. Gallese and Goldman suggest
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that MNs largely explain this process of mapping behavior and then understanding
the others’ minds.
Williams et al continues the direction proposed by Gallese, and draw the connection
among imitation, MNs and autism [98]. They argue that imitation is ‘a prime candidate
for the building of a ToM (theory of mind)’, and that autistic people have deficit in
imitation. The response of MNs system in human shows the ability of imitation. They
conclude that such a deficit in imitation creates problems in social interaction and
contribute to the lack of empathy in autistic people.
2.2.5 Discussion
Autistic people suffer a wide spectrum of problems. The deficits in social interaction
and language learning are the most prominent. Both are considered to be related
to the lack of ToM. As we have discussed, there are two major competing models
for explaining this: Theory Theory (ToM) and Simulation Theory. A second line of
problems are emotion-related, such as lack of empathy . The affective foundation
theory is the first to look at these problems. Although none of the existing theory has
really unveiled the root of stereo-typed behavior, such as sameness and repetition.
The newer theory, namely simulation based theory, has shown promising develop-
ment by applying properties of MNs in connection with autism. It seems to explain
the lack of theory of mind which affects social and language learning, and lack of
empathy.
However, if we are in agreement of such deficit in MNs system in autistic people
and the fact that it is the prime base for ToM and social interaction, do we get the
conclusion that autistic people can never learn social interaction or theory of mind?
I believe there are deeper philosophical questions that need to be answered. What
are the natural emergence of theory of mind and social meaning? Is there an un-nature
process which purely rely on high-level intelligence as many autistic people have
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normal to higher-than-average intelligence? These are questions beyond the scope of
current study. However, I want to conclude the chapter with a quote from the chapter
on the autistic professor, Temple Gardin, in “An anthropologist on Mars” by Oliver
Sacks:
... What is it, then, I pressed her further, that goes on between normal people, from
which she feels herself excluded? It has to do, she has inferred, with an implicit knowl-
edge of social conventions and codes, of cultural presuppositions of every sort. This
implicit knowledge, which every normal person accumulates and generates throughout
life on the basis of experience and encounters with others, Temple seems to be largely
devoid of. Lacking it, she has instead to ‘compute’ others’ intentions and states of
mind, to try to make algorithmic, explicit, what for the rest of us is second nature. ...
The subject, Temple Grandin, shows clear self-introspection, ideas of ToM and
understands that her way of perceiving social interaction is different. She actually
wrote a book on social rules [31] “The Unwritten Rules of Social Relationships:
Decoding Social Mysteries Through the Unique Perspectives of Autism” with another
autistic adult. Who would imagine that when she was diagnosed with autism as a
child, the doctor had suggested life-long institutionalization for Temple?
So maybe both Theory Theory and Simulation Theory are partially right. However,
they are two different approaches to understanding of ToM and social interaction. I
would call simulation-based a more natural kind. More psychological and experimental
research needs to be done in this direction.
2.3 Signaling
2.3.1 Sender-Receiver Model
In this section, we will briefly review some important developments in sender-receiver
configuration. I will group different theses into two types: the theory type and model
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type, and disregard the chronological order. We will start with some modelers, and
continue with a few theoretical developments. At the end of this section, I will
summarize the key features that are important to this chapter from both groups.
Although Shannon developed Information Theory, I still consider him more of a
modeler in the context of sender-receiver model and in comparison with other theorists
whom I will discuss later. Shannon defined the early version of sender-receiver process
to illustrate the information delivery from the world to a sender who signals through
channels to a receiver. Lewis further developed the model in a more game theoretic
setting [45] to show that meaning is a result of sender-receiver interaction given
common interest and knowledge. Skyrms pushes the model a couple of steps further
in the direction of a naturalistic approach. He shows that without the assumption
of common knowledge and high level of intelligence, the meaning of a signal can
still evolve. In fact, his model shows a continuous application of sender-receiver
configuration at all biological levels.
Both Dretske [20] and Millikan develop detailed theoretical accounts for how
information is being processed. Dretske gives enriched explanation of information in a
natural and objective manner, in a sense that a signal with information is not tied
to a time, a person or a history. Millikan disagrees and believes that signals are tied
to a person and his/her history. In her book ‘Varieties Of Meaning’ [51], she further
defines natural signs in a local and recurrent sense. As Millikan’s theory on varieties
of meaning (signs) is quite important for my discussion, we shall come back to the
details in the later sections.
So which aspects of the models and theories are important for this dissertation?
I will call it a quasi-Lewis-Skyrms configuration. It certainly is a sender-receiver
configuration. I want to use the game theoretic aspect, in which the interaction between
the sender and receiver, and re-enforcing reward, naturally stabilize a particular
meaning of the signals. However, at the same time, I will incorporate Millikan’s
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S1 2 0 0
S2 0 2 0
S3 0 0 1
various refined definition of signals into the game theoretical framework. Eventually I
hope such a quasi-Lewis-Skyrms configuration can be a tool to distinguish the two
kinds of perceptive meaning (signals) between people. In addition, I hope we can
illustrate how misinformation can happen in both cases, and why only in one case it
can be corrected.
2.3.2 The Lewis-Skyrms Signaling Game
I will start with Lewis’ signaling game. In a typical setting, there are two agents who
want to achieve a common goal, for example the sexton of the Old North Church and
Paul Revere. A crucial difficulty they are facing in the Revere Story is that neither
can achieve the goal alone, in this case to inform the American defenders against the
British army. The sexton can observe the arrival of the army, but cannot inform;
while Revere can help with defending, but cannot observe the arrival. Hence, they
established a signaling game for coordination. In the game, there are three states
(invasion by land, invasion by sea and no invasion), three signals accordingly (one
lantern, two lantern and no lantern), and each could result in an action (preparation
for invasion by land, preparation for invasion by sea and no preparation). Table 2.1
represents a normal-form game matrix for the Revere story.
More formally speaking, there are two functions (fc and fa), which are used by
the communicator(sender) of the signal and the audience(receiver) respectively15. The
15I will use ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ from now on as they are more conventional.
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sender can observe a set of states, and has a set of signals available; while the receiver
can not observe the states, but has a set of actions he can use to act on each signal. fc
is a mapping from states to signals. fa is a mapping from each signal to at most one
action. Coming back to the Revere story, the sexton as the sender can observe three
states S1 (by land), S2 (by sea), and S3 (no invasion). He also has three possible signals
to use M1 (one lantern), M2 (two lantern) and M3 (no lantern). Revere as the receiver
can have three different acts A1 (preparation for land), A2 (for sea), and A3 (none). If
fc is a one-to-one function, it is called admissible. Similarly, fa can be admissible. A
pair of admissible functions < fc, fa > is a signaling system. In the game matrix, such
pairs of functions give a set of equilibriums < (S1, A1), (S2, A2), (S3, A3) >. The pair
of state and act which gives both sender and receiver best payoff when the interests
of the two are aligned. Hence there could be multiple signal systems. In the Revere
story, we could have M2 for S1, M1 for S2, and M3 for S3. Receiver’s act would change
accordingly too. A1 for M2, A2 for M1, and A3 for M3. However, the equilibrium does
not change.
Now let us look at a few important assumptions in Lewis signaling games and
then connect them to Skyrms’ book. The first two assumptions are common interest
and common knowledge. Common interest is reflected in the payoff structure, i.e.
both get maximum payoff when a signaling system is established. The fact that both
parties are assumed to have a certain level of reasoning ability, which enables them
to make an agreement and have higher order expectation of each other, reflects the
common knowledge assumption. The third assumption is made on how a particular
signal system is chosen. As we have shown above, multiple signal systems can exist
in one game. Lewis assumes the players either have a prior agreement or a natural
salience when choosing a particular signaling system.
Skyrms book Signals responds to all these three assumptions and pushes the game
in a more naturalistic direction. First, common interests are not necessary, as he shows
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how senders and receivers may have partial or opposite interests. He also argues that
signaling games can be useful in the analysis of a wider biological spectrum without a
high level reasoning capacity, thus eliminating the need for common knowledge. By
using evolutionary dynamics, he shows that without any natural salience16 a signal
system can emerge.
2.3.3 Information in ‘Signals’
Under the naturalistic assumptions, Skyrms emphasizes the importance of the infor-
mation flow from the beginning of the book (page 2). He argues that the meaning of
signals can be studied through the information carried by signals. Such information
is further measured by its quantity and content. Skyrms derives the quantity of
information from the mathematical theory of information which was originated by
Claude Shannon.
As we have briefly pointed out above, Skyrms uses evolutionary dynamics to show
the emergence of signaling systems. Initially, nature creates necessary states with equal
probabilities. The quantity of information is how much a signal moves probabilities.
If we have two states S1 and S2 with initial probabilities pS1 = 0.5, pS2 = 0.5, and a
signal A moves the probabilities of the two states to (pS1 = 0.2, pS2 = 0.8), then the
information quantity is the same as another signal B which moves the probabilities to
(pS2 = 0.2, pS1 = 0.8). Skyrms defines information content as a vector which indicates
not only how far a signal moves the states’ probabilities, but also in which direction.
In our example, information content for signal A is different from that of signal B,
since they affect the probabilities in opposite directions.
16Clearly, it also assumed to have no prior agreement since high level reasoning capacity is not
assumed.
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2.4 Social Software: From Social Procedure to Homo
Sociologicus
Although we are approaching the conclusion, we are far from concluding if we do not
review the seminal work on the topic from Parikh. We have purposefully excluded
his work thus far hoping to explain the seemingly-unrelated past chapters through
introducing a series of his past important and highly interdisciplinary works. Therefore,
in this chapter we will review a few key works from Parikh related to the search of
homo sociologicus. Then we will continue with a section that explains the connection
between his work and the direction of this dissertation.
Parikh has had interest in social sphere for decades, such as [65] [56] . In 1995, he
officially coined the term, Social Software [57] [58], and called for an interdisciplinary
collaboration between computer scientists and social scientists. In [58], he points out
that computer science concepts, such as algorithms and data, were already described
in early philosophical works that concerns social context. At the same time, he also
gives a few real life social problems, for example car parking problems, which could
have been improved by using an algorithm like social procedure. He gives a famous
game theory example, the Santa Fe bar problem, which was discussed first by Brian
Arthur [8] in 1994 , later also by Greenwald, Mishra and Parikh [32] in 1998. As Parikh
explains in [58], when the demand of a public good exceeds the supply in a group of
people, the conventional free market approach is not always the most desirable one
socially. He states the “striking contrast between the efficiency with which purely
computational processes are carried out, and the inefficiency of the social processes
which are intended to be... ”. Therefore he argues that the role of algorithms and
game theory in social procedures should be properly studied and positioned. [58] is an
important first step that opens the research area of social software.
Like the beginning of any theory, key concepts have to be properly raised, discussed,
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and defined. In the work of social software, there are a few such concepts that were
elaborately explained by Parikh in [59] [60] [61]. Being an expert on the topic of
knowledge, Parikh focuses on the technical aspects of knowledge in [59] based on his
past work in distributed computing together with Krasucki [66] and Ramanujam [67].
He suggests that understanding the levels of knowledge under different circumstances
is crucial. Later in [60], Parikh brings attention to the knowledge and logic structure
of algorithms in social context. The paper displays the necessity of logical structure
in the car parking problems and logical conditions in using a key.
Starting from “Logic of Society” [63], Parikh starts to list more directions that
could be taking in the social software research besides the previous focuses, knowledge,
logic and planning. It sheds some light on ‘softer’ issues such as rationality, incentives
and preferences, culture and tradition. To be more specific, the social software project
is extending to the human elements.
[69] continues this extension to game theory. In the paper, Parikh, Tasdemir and
Witzel illustrate how different types of people use the same utility function differently.
The knowledge of your opponent’s type in a game is a ‘game-changer’. Two relatively
recent papers of Parikh, [64] and [68], are extending quest of human elements in a
more philosophical direction.
The works mentioned above are just highlights of Parikh’s research. They appear
to follow a direction of from system to components, from the hard issues to soft issues,
and from social procedure to homo sociologicus.
2.5 The Jigsaw Puzzle: in Search of Homo Socio-
logicus
We first raised the need for a better theory for predicting people making social related
choices through reviewing two widely experimented games: Public Goods Game and
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Ultimatum Game. Then we reviewed a theoretical pillar: the rational choice theory.
Parikh points out in [63], “actual behavior differs from theoretical prediction and
seems to follow some pre-existing cultural pattern”. Getting back to the queuing
example in [58], besides FIFO, there are other different possibilities. For example,
people who come late can still go to the front of the queue. What stops him from doing
that? The pure ethical concern? Or fear of others’ scolding? He suggests that the
work from Lewis on convention [45] has great relevance to the subject. We, therefore,
reviewed the famous signaling game from [45]. Skyrms provides a more evolutionary
and biological view of the game, which could help us understand how signals and
meaning form over time. Potentially, we could blend his ideas into defining social
signals, which is the next step that we want to take in our research.
This dissertation is in the direction of converging with the social software project
led by Parikh. The focus is how to define the sociality within each individual. More
importantly how is such sociality related to our rationality and choices.
Rational choice theory serves a theoretical pillar to all concerning choices including
making choices in a group, which is the focus here. However in such situation, sociality
is reflected on two levels, namely the group level and individual level. Most of the work
in the plethora of social software research concerns the first. We want to argue that the
second level is equally important. What is sociality on an individual level? Although
this is a crucial point that requires more detailed explanation in the future research,
we can simply see it as a kind of social influence when individuals are making decisions.
For example, in both Public Goods Game and Ultimatum Game experiments, people
deviated from classical game theoretical predictions. We shall not easily conclude that
they were irrational because their behaviors do not fit within conventional rational
choice framework. As we have seen from the experimental results in [35] from the 15
small scale societies, such deviations are highly correlated with their social structure.
Clearly, there is some kind of rationale in these people’s choice. Of course, these
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subjects didn’t study different social systems and then decide one choice for a situation
like Public Goods Game or Ultimatum Game. So how did they decide? What is the
social influence here?
Chapter 3
Knowledge and Epistemic Logic
3.1 Knowledge
We can trace original epistemology, the study of knowledge, back to the Ancient
Greek philosophy. The Theaetetus, which are considered Plato’s greatest work on
epistemology [14], focuses on the question “What is knowledge?”. In general, the study
concerns the following questions: “What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of
knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are its limits?” [90].
Here in this dissertation, we are more focused on the formal aspects of the knowledge.
More specifically, we will review some existing frameworks in epistemic logic and
recent development in dynamic epistemic logic such as friends’ influence. At the end
of this chapter, we will also discuss some technical results on language splitting which
is useful for our new logic system.
3.2 Formal Frameworks
Von Wright’s work (1951), An essay in modal logic [95], is widely considered to be the
first proper formal treatment of epistemic logic. In 1962, Jaakko Hintikka extended
the work in his book Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the
36
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Two Notions [36]. Saul Kripke made a technical breakthrough in 1963 [43] with his
Kripke semantics. In the Kripke semantics, < W,R, |=> is called a Kripke-model. W
represents a possible set of worlds that are accessible for the agents. R represents the
relation between the worlds, which should be symmetric, reflexive, transitive, etc. |=
reads as “models”. We can use this to express the Alice example again. m,w |= KaP
says that there is a model m in a world w such that the statement “Alice (a) knows
statement P” is true. The following axiom Ka(A → B) → (KaA → KaB) is called
K axiom1. This axiom constitutes System K, the most basic reasoning system in
epstemic logic. More reasoning axioms can be added to the system. Hence we also
have System D, System T, System S4, etc.
In the work of the Logic of Belief Revision, AGM [3] model is the most dominant
theory. A belief state includes a set of sentences (statements), which is logically closed
and is called “a theory”. Let us assume K represents a belief state of an agent, i.e. K
is a logically closed set of sentences. There are three types of belief changes that can
happen to a belief state K.
• Expansion: A sentence p is added to K and nothing in K is removed. The new
belief set is K + p.
• Contraction: A sentence p is removed from K. The new belief set2 is K ÷ p
with some adjustment needed.
• Revision: A sentence p is added to K, and at the same time some sentences are
removed if they contradict with p. The new belief set is K ∗ p.
The last type, belief revision, can have an absurd consequence. When a new
sentence that is inconsistent with K is added, all the information in K can be
discarded. This is clearly unrealistic. In real life, when we learn something about the
1If an agent a knows the implication between the two statements A and B, then if she knows A,
she may also know B
2This notation differs in different literature.
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weather we retain our beliefs about politics. In the last section of this chapter, we will
see how this can be improved by using splitting languages.
3.3 Friends’ Influence
The most recent development of dynamic epistemic logic is to apply belief revision
in social networks. We always have a group of people that are close to us and who
can also influence our beliefs in many ways. More importantly understanding the
belief influence in a group of people will help us understand how social belief changes
happen at a local level. Liu et al [47] do suggest a simple yet normative model for
social belief change, called ‘threshold influence’.
In their framework, they look at Friendships which is taken to be a symmetric and
irreflexive relation. So an agent is a friend of any friend of hers, but she is not her own
friend. In addition, they do not assume that friendship is transitive. Therefore friends
of friends are not necessarily friends. Friendships among a group of people create a
social network, or community. Agents start with some initial belief towards an issue p.
They can be Bp (believe p), B¬p (believe the negation of p), or Up (no opinion on p).
In the process of communicating with friends, this belief can be changed in two ways.
When the agent is strongly influenced by friends (Sp), it leads to belief revision (Rp).
Similarly, when she is weakly influenced (Wp), it leads only to belief contraction (Cp).
Symbol F means ‘all my friends’. Therefore FBp means ‘all my friends believe
p’. In the framework, Liu et al further define the dual operator 〈F 〉 as ‘some of my
friends’. 〈F 〉Bp means some of my friends believe p. Then they add the aspect of a
threshold. For instance assuming my threshold is 100%, if I believe p but all of my
friends believe ¬p, then I will change my own belief to ¬p. but if only some of my
friends believe ¬p then I will become undecided about p.
Within a group of friends, beliefs tend to be adopted from one to the other. It
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Figure 3.1: An example of an unstable structure
creates a distribution of beliefs in the community. Liu et al [47] look at the influence
one could gain from a socially connected agent.
The three possible doxastic states of a proposition p can be defined through
following axioms:
• Strong influence: Sϕ↔ (FBϕ ∧ 〈F 〉Bϕ)
• Weak influence: Wϕ↔ (F¬B¬ϕ ∧ 〈F 〉Bϕ)
Liu et al also look at the stability of beliefs in different friendship-based networks.
They defined a program, Ip with following rules:
if Sp then Rp else if Wp then C¬p
if S¬p then R¬p else if W¬p then Cp
They call a community stable when the program Ip has no effect on the belief
states of the members. Some communities become stable after a few applications of
Ip. Some can never be stable. Then these communities are said to be in flux. Figure
3.1 is one such example.
3.4 Language Splitting
Parikh [62] shows that a person’s beliefs can be uniquely divided into different subject
matters and so if his beliefs are a theory T in L then L will split naturally into
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sublanguages L1 ∪ L2 ∪ ...Ln and T will split into T1 ∪ T2 ∪ ...Tn, each Ti in Li.
This idea of splitting language was naturally applied to belief revision. If I learn
some political fact, it will not change my views about my teeth or the location of
my children. Moreover, if have trouble with my car, I will not consult a dentist.
Conversely I will not consult a garage mechanic about my teeth.
Before we look into Parikh’s axioms for language splitting, let us review the original
AGM axioms which can lead to some forgetful updates.
AGM Axioms
1. T ∗ A is a theory
2. A ∈ T ∗ A
3. If A⇔ B, then T ∗ A = T ∗B.
4. T ∗ A ⊆ T + A
5. If A is consistent with T , i.e. it is not the case that ¬A ∈ T , then T ∗A = T +A
6. T ∗ A is consistent if A is.
7. T ∗ (A ∧B) ⊆ (T ∗ A) +B
8. If ¬B 6∈ T ∗ A then (T ∗ A) +B ⊆ T ∗ (A ∧B)
If A is consistent with T , then T ∗ A = T + A, otherwise T ∗ A = Con(A).
Given these axioms, a forgetful update is allowed by AGM, in which case when A is
inconsistent with T , all information in T is discarded.
Clearly this kind of updates are unrealistic since in real life when we learn something
about weather we retain our beliefs about politics. Parikh improves this update by
using Craig’s Interpolation Theorem.
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Craig’s Interpolation Theorem
Theorem 3.4.1: Let L1, L2 be first order languages, L = L1 ∩ L2 and T1, T2 be
theories in L1, L2, respectively such that T1 ∪ T2 has no model (is inconsistent). Then
there is some formula ψ of L such that T1 ` ψ and T2 ` ¬ψ. In particular, if φ is an
L1 formula and ξ is an L2 formula and T1 ∪ T2, φ ` ξ then there exists an L-formula
ψ such that T1, φ ` ψ and T2, ψ ` ξ. 
3.4.1 P Axioms
Parikh proposed following axioms to improve the belief updates, which prevent the
discarding all the information in the way we mentioned in a forgetful update.
1. Axiom P1: If T is split between L1 and L2, and A is an L1 formula, then T ∗A
is also split between L1 and L2.
2. Axiom P2: If T is split between L1 and L2, A, B are in L1 and L2 respectively,
then T ∗ A ∗B = T ∗B ∗ A.
3. Axiom P2g: If T split between L1 and L2, A, B are in L1 and L2 respectively,
then T ∗ A ∗B = T ∗B ∗ A = T ∗ (A ∧B)
4. Axiom P3: If T is confined to L1 and A is in L1 then T ∗ A is just the
consequences in L of T ∗′A where ∗′ is the update of T by A in the sub-language
L1
All these axioms follow from axiom P below:
Axiom P: If T = Con(A,B) where A,B are in L1, L2 respectively and C is in L1,





The Network Science is truly interdisciplinary. Euler’s solution of the Königsberg
bridge problem in 1735 is considered the first true proof in the theory of networks [53].
The vast body of knowledge has been applied to physics, mathematics, computer
science, biology, economics and sociology. With the access to cheaper computing power
at the turn of this century, the science has been focusing on different problems [96],
many of which are supported with empirical observations [10].
The 2003 Northeast blackout is considered a famous example of cascading failure
in a network [10]. In that event, 55 million people lost their power. A more recent
example (see figure 4.1) would be Google. On March 12th 2015, the search giant’s
service was inaccessible for millions due to a cascading failure caused by a routing
leak which originated from an Indian ISP. Both cases expose the vulnerability due to
interconnectivity in a network.
For our purpose of understanding social issues, this following example which is
explained by Barabási in the very beginning his book Network Science, seems more
relevant.
42
CHAPTER 4. NETWORK THEORY 43
Figure 4.1: Google went down for millions of users due to a routing leak from an
Indian ISP
Figure 4.2: Image from Network Science by Albert-László Barabási
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In March 2003, American forces entered Iraq. But they were unsuccessful at
capturing high ranking officials including Saddam Hussein. Later, the US military
reconstructed the social network of Hussein, relied on gossip and family trees instead of
government documents. Using the social network diagram, there were a few successful
raids including one that led to an important piece of intel: a family album. It
dramatically helped with further understanding of Hussein’s trusted network. The
military was eventually able to figure out the hiding place of Saddam Hussein.
Through the example, Barabási points out a few important observations of network
theory:
• The predicative power: it allows even non-experts to extract useful information.
• The remarkable stability: the social network was not constructed through
updated intelligence but dated information such as gossips and family photo
albums.
• The choice of network can be crucial. In the case of Hussein, the military tried
for months to find him through the network of the Iraqi government. But it was
personal network that eventually helped.
4.2 Basic Concepts
Often ‘networks’ and ‘graphs’ are often used interchangeably by researchers. However
in Network Science, we use the terms: network, node, and link, while in Graph
Theory, we use the terms: graph, vertex and edge. In this chapter, we will use the
terminologies from network science.
Let us review some basic concepts in network science. N , Number of Nodes is the
total number of components in a network. L, Number of Links, is the total number of
interactions between the nodes. A link can be either directed or undirected. When we
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trace how a message is being sent in a network, the links are directed from senders to
receivers. When we look at hand-shaking in a group of people, the links are undirected
since a handshake always takes two people at the same time.
Degree, k, is an important concept in network science. It is the number of links
from a node to other nodes. In undirected networks, we have following relationship













In directed networks, we have incoming degree, kini and outgoing degree, kouti .
Therefore the total degree of a node i is:
ki = kini + kouti






















pk, the degree distribution, is the probability that a randomly selected node in the
network has degree k. Generally, we have ∑∞k=1 pk = 1. In a fixed network that has N
nodes, we have: pk = NkN , where Nk represents the number of nodes that has degree k.
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In a network that is a complete graph, which means every node is connected to





= N(N−1)2 . However, most of the networks
observed in real life are sparse [10].
Often it is easier to talk networks in the adjacency matrix. Therefore, we will
review some concepts and formula related to it. In a directed network with N nodes,
the adjacency matrix has N rows and N columns. Aij = 1 when there is a link
pointing from node j to node i. Aij = 0 when there is no link between node j and
node i. In an undirected network, Aij = Aji. Since Aij” represents the links, we can

















A path is a route from one node to another in a network. It can pass through the
same link more than once. It can also intersect itself. A shortest path, dij, is a path
between i and j with fewest number of links. In undirected networks, dij = dji, while
in directed networks, dij 6= dji. A network diameter, dmax is the maximal shortest path
in a network. Average path length, 〈d〉 is 1
N(N−1)
∑




i,j=1,N di,j in an undirected network.
When there is a path between two nodes (i and j), we say that they are connected,
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Figure 4.3: Connected and Disconnected Networks [10]
and otherwise they are disconnected with dij =∞. A network is connected if all the
pairs of nodes are connected.
In figure 7.3 (a), it is a disconnected network with two components. If we place a
single link between 2 and 4, the network becomes (b) which is connected. This link is
called a bridge.
In real life networks, e.g. social networks, highly density ties are often observed.
Let us review a concept that is related to it. The local clustering coefficient represent
the degree of how neighbors of a node are connected to each other. For a node i with




where Li is the total number of links between the neighbors of node i.
Ci measures the local density in a network. It is between 0 and 1. When Ci = 1,
the neighbors of i are fully connected and form a complete graph. When Ci = 0, none
of the neighbors of i are connected.
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Figure 4.4: The incoming and outgoing degree distribution of the WWW from [2]
4.3 The Scale-Free Property
When the WWW was first mapped out in 1999 [2], it was discovered that the network
had many highly connected nodes unlike in a random network. In fact, many real
networks have the same property [10]. It is called the scale-free property. We can
represent the degree distribution of the WWW in following manner:
pk ∼ k−γ
We call this a power law distribution with a degree exponent γ. After taking a
logarithm of the formula above, we get: log pk ∼ −γlog k.
In directed networks, we will have following:
pkin ∼ k−γin
pkout ∼ k−γout
When we compare a scale-free network with a random network whose distribution
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Figure 4.5: A Poisson function compared with a power-law function with γ = 2.1.
Both have 〈k〉 = 10. [10]
is a Poisson distribution, we observe that the probability of high-degree nodes is much
higher in a scale-free network. (See figure 7.5 and 7.6) In addition, there are many
small degree nodes in scale-free networks while they are absent in random network.
Figure 7.6 is an example of a scale-free network with 〈k〉 = 3. “The more nodes a
scale-free network has, the larger are its hubs.” [10].
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Figure 4.6: Same two functions as above shown on a log-log plot. [10]




We are extending Friend Influence to show how influence on a subject travels in general.
We call it Expert Influence. Before we discuss this type of belief updates, we are going
to review some preconditions of the model.
Resolving differences of opinions among experts will bring us to the judgment
aggregation problem which was investigated by List and Pettit [46]. Such issues are
very difficult and this paper is not the right place to address it. We will start with
the simple assumption of having one expert in each area in a social network at the
beginning of an influence process. In addition, we look at connected social network
only, i.e. there is no isolated person or groups in the network. We study how Expert
Influence on a single proposition can travel through the network.
In this method, we employs all AGM axioms, P axioms from [62], and two new
additional axioms that instruct agents what to do when they are influenced by an
expert or a non-expert.
• Influence from Expert to Non-expert: Before a non-expert talks to an
expert on p, he can believe p, believe ¬p or have no opinion about p. Once the
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non-expert talks to a neighboring expert about p, he adopts the beliefs of the
expert and become an expert on p himself.
• Influence between Non-experts: Between two non-experts, if they have
different beliefs about p, they both contract their beliefs on p since none of them
are authoritative on the matter.
These conditions and axioms can be expressed formally in the following way.
1. Agents N = {1, 2, ...n} in a social network of G
2. R ⊆ N ×N
3. R is symmetric and irreflexive
4. 3 possible doxastic states:
(a) believe p: Bp
(b) disbelieve p: B¬p
(c) no belief about p: Up = ¬Bp ∧ ¬B¬p
Expert Influence Axioms
• Expert influence to a non-expert: R(i, j) ∧ E(i, p, t) ∧ B(i, p, t) ∧ (B(j, p, t) ∨
B(j,¬p, t) ∨ U(j, p, t)) ∧ ¬E(j, p, t)→ B(j, p, t+ 1) ∧ E(j, p, t+ 1)
This can clearly be simplified to: R(i, j) ∧ E(i, p, t) ∧B(i, p, t) ∧ ¬E(j, p, t)→
B(j, p, t+ 1) ∧ E(j, p, t+ 1)
• Influence between non-experts: R(i, j) ∧ ¬E(i, p, t) ∧ ¬E(j, p, t) ∧ B(i, p, t) ∧
B(j,¬p, t)→ U(i, p, t+ 1) ∧ U(j, p, t+ 1)
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Figure 5.1: Example 1: Single Expert - beginning
Figure 5.2: Example 1: Single Expert - during
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Figure 5.3: Example 1: Single Expert - end
5.2 Examples of Expert Influence
Let us now look at two possible scenarios of Expert Influence.
In example 1 (figure 5.1 - 5.3), 5 agents are in the network with a as an expert
on p (marked in with a bold circle) initially. Communication can happen anytime
between two agents, however, Expert Influence starts to spread only when a starts
communicating with her neighbors. The figures show one of the many possible influence
order. Figure 2 shows that agent a influenced c who has already become an expert
on p. At the same time, we can see that b and e also communicated. Since they had
different beliefs on p and none of them is an expert, they contracted their beliefs on
the matter. At the end of the influence process, we can see that every agent in the
network adopt the opinion of the expert and become an expert on p (figure 5.3).
We have assumed that at the beginning of the influence process, there is only one
expert in each area. However, it is possible to have two experts when we look at two
areas of expertise. In example 2 (figure 5.4 and 5.5), the 5 agents are in same network
structure as in example 1. Both a and d are experts, although in two areas (p and q)
which are indicated by bold and dashed circles respectively. The experts’ influence
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Figure 5.4: Example 2 (Two Experts) - beginning
Figure 5.5: Example 2 - end the influence for agent b
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spread out in a similar fashion as in example 1. Agent b is at a special position in the
network since he is connected to both expert a and expert d. By applying the axiom
P2G, we can show that b will have Ep ∧ Eq. In addition, b is going to be the first
person in the network to become an expert on both subject matters, regardless how
the two different influence processes play out.
5.3 Computation Complexity of Experts Influence
Proposition 5.3.1: The problem of influencing the whole network in one expertise
is reducible to the single-source longest path problem. 
The communication among all agents is non-deterministic. Any agent can be the
first to talk to another and update her belief. However, once the expert starts talking
to her neighbors, the expert influence does have directions. Eventually when the
agent who is furthest away from the expert is influenced, then the whole network has
converged to expert’s belief on p in O(N) time. In real networks, logN is observed.
From the complexity analysis we can see that this type of expert influence can
spread the expert’s beliefs rapidly within a network of people. This may explain how
hundreds of thousands people can use a one-to-one mobile app to coordinate efficiently
during the Hong Kong protest in 2014.
In most of the situations in real life, we have different types of influence that
sometimes conflict with one another. For example, you get an invitation to a party.
Both your friends and your colleagues may received the invitation too. The two groups
may have different opinions about the party. Therefore one may suggest to go and the
other may suggest not to go. How do you make decisions under different influences
that contradict? In the next chapter, we will suggest a simple decision making process
that people could use to make strategic decisions.
Chapter 6
Coordination Under Influence
6.1 Influence and Coordination in Networks
There are many events in our daily life that require coordination with our friends and
acquaintance. For example, we would like to go to a party only if enough interesting
people are going. In some situations, such as a dinner party for a small group of people
who we know, we can just contact our friends and ask. However, in some situations,
such a gallery opening party which you have heard from some friends, you cannot
contact everyone. In the second type of party, you may want to meet strangers who
are interesting. On one hand, you cannot contact people you have not met. On the
other hand, since your friends told you about the event, they may know some of the
people who are going. Then coordination can happen through understanding influence
in our social network.
In the past, we may still be able to find the information for deciding whether we
would go to an event or take an action easily, since our social networks were generally
smaller. In the era of infostorm, not only we are overwhelmed by information, but
also having ever expending social network through all kinds of social media. How do
we make good decision given different kinds of influence in a large social network?
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We have introduced two different belief update methods, namely Friend Influence
and Expert Influence. It is clearly that both can be separately applied in different
situations. In the case of a small dinner party, we probably get influenced through
friends who are invited and coordinate with them. In the case of a gallery opening
party, the influence may come naturally from an artist friend who is going and is an
expert of such events. It is also possible that we get influenced both from our friends
and experts at the same time. How do we choose which one to follow when the two are
in conflict? More importantly, in an event that requires group coordination, can we
choose strategically as an individual without global planning with all the participants?
In this section, we investigate how agents can be influenced differently in one
event. We will first introduce the concept of Expect Influence which indicate potential
influence of an agent or a group of agents. Then we will discuss how conflicting
influence may raise between two different belief-update methods. At the end, we will
discuss how network structure can affect people’s choices of belief updates.
6.2 Expected Influence
During an event, such as a party, the people who are invited, are coordinating on an
action which has two options either attend when there are enough interesting people
going or not attend. Of course, they could contact each other and coordinate globally
within a community. However, as we enter the era of infostorm, our network is growing
ever larger. Such centralized coordination becomes more difficult and inefficient in
some situations.
Every person in the network has her own knowledge about the local network she
is in. She can then use that knowledge to decide how she wants to be influenced and
take actions. In order to make such decision, she needs to have a simple indicator,
Expected Influence, which allows her to compare the influence from different groups of
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people in her network. This way she can maximize her benefit from taking the action
under a particular influence.
Let us look back to the example of a gallery opening. Alice received an invitation
of the opening. However, she is not too familiar with the crowd. She does know that a
few people in her social network are invited too. Some of them actually encouraged her
to go along with them while some told her that it is going to be a boring event. Alice,
being a mellow person, is happy to go if she believes that the majority of the invited
guests are going. She would also be happy if she chooses to stay at home, and most
people also decide not to go. Before she makes a decision, she gathers information
from her social network. Then she could update her belief using the Friend Influence
model which means her belief and action depend on her friends’. She could also update
her belief using the Expert Influence model which means her belief and action depend
on what she hears from the expert in her network, for example a seasoned artist who
knows the crowd and have extensive experience with this type of gallery openings.
It is possible that the two methods lead to the same action which she would take.
It is also possible that two methods are in conflict. In the second case, Alice would
think about her goal, being happy in this case, and strategically choose a method that
maximizes the happiness. This means she needs to pick an action which is going to
be taken by most people. Therefore she would assess whether her friends have more
influence or the expert.
As we are influenced more and more through the social media platforms, it is harder
for a community member to know how and when her acquaintances are influenced.
Therefore, in this paper, we do not look at how an agent reaches to the point of being
influenced and has to make a decision for her action. We are more interested in given
the network, the influence she receives at a moment, and how she would strategically
choose.
When we look at the influence of a person or a group of people, we do not look
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Figure 6.1: Conflicting Influence 1
at how many people they have already influenced, but how many people they can
potentially influence. Therefore we define the concept in the following way.
Definition 6.2.1: IG,G ⊆ Ag where Ag is the set of agents in the network, indicates
the potential influence of the group G. It is the number of agent in this set, |G|,
plus the total number of direct neighbors (Di) of each agent in group G removing the
number of duplicated agents.





Figure 6 is a local network that is connected to the rest of the network through E.
There are 5 agents, namely A, B, C, D, and E. “Y” and “N” indicates if each agent
believes that the opening will be an interesting one. “Y” means yes, and implies that
the agent would probably go to the opening party. “N” means no. “u” in B means
that B is undecided. The numbers in figure 6 indicates the degree of each node, i.e.
the number of neighbors of each agent. E is the expert in this local network, who has
a reputation of being the expert. Therefore the number of her neighbors is known to
everyone in the local network. Some agents’ neighbors are completely observable in
the local network, such as A, B, C, and D. Some agent’s neighbors, such as the 10
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neighbors of E, are not all on this local graph. Here we also assume that the rest of 9
neighbors of E are not in this local graph.
The influence of agent A is I{A} = 3. The influence of agent B and C, I{B,C}, is 4.
Influence of agent E and C, I{E,C}, is 13.
6.3 Belief Conflict and Coordination Equilibria
Now we continue to look at the gallery opening example in figure 6 and find out how
an agent can choose between the two methods of belief update. Since agent B is
undecided, we will focus on her and see how she can update her belief and choose the
better update that maximize her happiness.
Just as we mentioned earlier, there is only one expert in the local network. In this
example, it is E. Furthermore we will assume that the expert is always more actively
talking about her expertise to the people in her network. In the example here, it
means agent B get influenced by E first. The other agents, A and D are friends1 of B.
We can see that all of B’s friends think it will be a great party and probably going,
while the expert E believes that the party will not be so great. So how is B going to
be influenced and how will she choose what to do?
B receives the information from E first and updates her belief to E’s according
to the expert method that was defined earlier in the paper. Then B communicates
with her friends and finds out that her friends think otherwise. Now she has a choice
between being influenced by her friends and being influenced by the expert.
B has a coordination problem to solve. She wants to make a choice that majority
of the global network would choose. However, she does not have much knowledge
about the actual global network. She does not know how many are invited. She
certainly does not know who they are and how they are connected to each other. She
knows her neighbors and the number of neighbors they each have. What she could do
1Experts are not friends.
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is to choose an update that gives her maximized influence in her local network. We
further assume that the expert cannot be influenced by others since she believes that
she has the authority on the matter. B can consider the pair-wise coordination with
each of her friends.
Let us look at the coordination between B and D. Once they communicate their
beliefs with each other, they both know that the friends belief differs from the expert’s
belief. Since they each represent a different opinion, they are vague about the actions
they take, going to the party or not, so that they will not hurt each others’ feeling.
They ponder what to do given the Influence Matrix from table 1. When they choose
different beliefs to act upon ({Friends, Expert} and {Expert, Friends}), they are both
not happy. When they are choosing the same belief to act upon, then their happiness
depends on the expected influence.
IFriends = IB,D = |G{B,D} +DB +DD| = 4
IExpert = IB,E = ID,B,E = |G{B,E} +DB +DE| = 13
Because agent B is the undecided one, therefore when we estimate the influence
we have B’s degree in both methods. When if they choose expert method, it is I{B,E}
for B, and I{D, B, E} for D.
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In this payoff matrix, we have two equilibria, with {Friends, Friends} as a risk-
dominant equilibrium and {Expert, Expert} as a payoff-dominant equilibrium [34] [13].
It is reasonable to assume that they will pick the payoff-dominant equilibrium as they
both know the influence of the expert is higher.
Gintis [30] suggests that a payoff-dominant equilibrium is selected when players
believe that the Principle of Honest Communication, according to which players keep
their promises unless they can benefit by violating these promises and being believed.
We further make the natural assumption that regardless of the influence method,
it is always better to pick the group that gives more expected influence. This can
explains some social hypes [16, p. 37] through a perspective of social networks, such
as the famous El Farol Bar Problem [9]. This also shows that people tend to believe
and act on views that give them highest potential influence and ignore the source of
the information.
6.4 Different Types of Networks
With this simple influence indicator, we can investigate the relationship between a
belief update method and the structure of the network. We will show a few properties
in some basic network structures.
Proposition 6.4.1: In a social network that is a complete graph (fully connected),
two methods are the same. In fact, any group G ∈ ℘(Ag) has the same influence
I∗ = |Ag|. 
Proof. By induction on G. 
When a social network is so tightly connected, e.g. figure 7, each individual can
potential influence everyone, which also means each of them has little to none influence.
It is also natural to assume that such networks have few conflicts in general.
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Figure 6.2: Influence in a complete graph
Figure 6.3: Influence in a ring graph with 4 agents
Figure 6.4: Influence in a ring graph with 5 agents
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Figure 6.5: Influence in a star graph
Proposition 6.4.2: In a social network of |Ag| number of agents, if the structure is
a ring, friends I{i,j} = 4 always have equal influence as the expert I{i,e} = 4. 
Proof. Any of the two neighboring agents have influence of 4. Induction on |Ag|. 
Proposition 6.4.3: In a social network that is a structure of a star with |Ag| ≥ 4,
I{i,e} always has the most influence if e is at the center. Otherwise friend influence is
always stronger. 
Proof. (1) When the expert is at the center
I{i,e} = |Ag| since e is connected to everyone. I{i,j} = 2 for all i 6= j and i, j 6= e,
since none of the two none-experts are neighboring each other.
(2) When a non-expert is at the center
I{c,i} = |Ag| = I{c,e} with c as the agent who is at the center. I{i,e} = 2 for the
influence of any non-expert and expert (except the influence of the center agent
and expert). 
We can see that the network structure has an effect on how agents would choose
which type of belief updates as well. In a social network that is fully connected or
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has a ring structure, the agents are likely to treat the two methods equally if they are
in conflict. However in a network that has a structure of a star, the choice depends
on the position of the agents and the expert. An expert in the center knows that
he has enormous power that can influence the whole network. It also shows that
whoever has absolute control of the information flows has the control of behavior
of the whole network. We should note that, comparing with the game theoretical
approach we discussed earlier, these three propositions requires additional assumption
that everyone knows the network structure.
Chapter 7
Simulating Social Influence
After studying some of the properties of influence indicator, we are interested in seeing
how it could work on bigger and more complex networks. Therefore in this chapter,
we are going to introduce two different types of network: Watts-Strogatz [97] and
Barabási-Albert [1]. We will then show some simulation results in these networks.
We discover that the expert1 has different degrees of social power in different
network structures. In particular, a well-connected expert has a lot of power in the
Barabasi-Albert network, which is more similar to real world social network.
The random graphs from Paul Erdős and Alfréd Rényi [22] (ER graphs) is a
network model used in many applications. The ER graphs have two major issues
in comparison with real-world networks. First of all, these graphs do not have local
clustering which often observed in real life. Secondly, the degree distribution of ER
graphs is basically a Poisson distribution. However in the actually networks observed,
the degree distribution is a power law [72].
The Watts-Strogatz model and Barabási-Albert models are two different approaches
trying to improve the original ER graph to make the representation closer to real life.
In the first section, we will start with introducing the structure of Watts-Strogatz
1We have always assumed 1 expert in the network. In the simulation we also set the number of
expert to 1. This can be easily changed and extended in the future work.
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network. Then we will show some simulation results in this type of network. In the
second section, Barabási-Albert network will be explained. We will also see how the
simulation results in this type of networks are quite different from Watts-Strogatz
network.
7.1 Watts-Strogatz Networks
The Watts-Strogatz (WS) network is proposed by Watts and Strogatz in Nature [97].
It is a model that generate a particular kind of graphs with short average path lengths
and high clustering. WS network is a step closer to the real-life network. In particular,
it creates local clustering which is not in ER graphs.
A graph, G, has N nodes with a mean degree of K. β is a parameter that is
in [0, 1]. A WS graph with N nodes and NK2 edges is constructed in following two
steps [97]:
• Construct a ring lattice that is a graph with N nodes. Each node has K
neighbors with K2 on each side.
• For each nodes ni in n0, ..., nN−1, we connect the edge (ni, nj) ( i < j ) with
probability of β.
As β → 1, the WS graph converges to a ER graph with the clustering coefficient of
K
N
. And its degree distribution becomes a Poisson distribution as in a usual ER graph.
A WS graph shows local clustering without having hubs and a scale-free distribution
of degrees. Therefore when we simulate the social influence, both friend and expert
influence, we expect that power of influence is not as evenly distributed as in a ER
graph, but will have some degrees of segregation.
In each of the following 4 simulations, there are three figures. We start with the
initial network of agents with blue represents “Yes”, red represents “No”, and yellow
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Figure 7.1: WS Network - 1 - initial
represents “Uncertain” to an event. Second figure is the final situation after 6 rounds
of interactions. The last figure exhibits the history of changes in terms of the number
of nodes in blue, red and yellow respectively.
As we assumed in the earlier chapter, there is only one expert in the group of 30
agents. The expert is always in blue 2.
In this first example of a WS network, red is the largest group initially with 17
agents, then blue with 8 agents and yellow with 5. Over 3 rounds of influence, the
situation seems to be stabilized into two groups: 18 red agents and 12 blue agents.
In this first example of a WS network, red is again the largest group initially with
15 agents, then blue with 5 agents and yellow with 10. Over 3 rounds of influence, the
situation seems to be stabilized into three groups: 21 red agents, 2 yellow agents and
7 blue agents.
From these two example, we can find some commonalities about influence in WS
2This can be easily changed into red or yellow. The general result will not change.
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Figure 7.2: WS Network - 1 - final
Figure 7.3: WS Network - 1 - history
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Figure 7.4: WS Network - 2 - initial
Figure 7.5: WS Network - 2 - final
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Figure 7.6: WS Network - 2 - history
networks. First of all, when there are different opinions about an event and with two
types of influence methods, the agents did not converge into one color. Secondly, it
took relatively short time for the network to stabilize. Thirdly, the yellow agents may
not disappear completely, but tend to converge into blue or red. For example, in the
second simulation, there are a third of agents in yellow initially. At the end, there
was only two left.
We conclude that when there is no major hubs in the network, agents’ opinion
tend to stabilize among the local clusters.
7.2 Barabási-Albert Networks
The Barabási-Albert (BA) model [1] is an algorithm to generate random scale-free
networks that resemble networks observed in real-life more closely.
A BA network generation starts with a group of connected n0 nodes. Then each
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Figure 7.7: BA Network - 1 - initial
ki is the degree of node i,
∑
j kj is the sum of degrees of all pre-existing nodes
j. Nodes with with many links tend to have even more new links. This enables the
scale-free (power-law) degree distributions.
This type of degree distribution is observed in many real social networks [11]. So
let us simulate the types of influence in this framework.
All the setups are similar to WS network, except that expert is the hub of the
network, i.e. with the most connection.
In the first simulation, it starts with 15 red agents, 8 yellow agents, and 7 blue
agents. Although blue color has the least number of agents initially, it becomes the
only color very quickly after only two rounds of interactions.
The second simulation shows similar ending that the whole network converges to
blue. It starts out with 15 red agents, and many more yellow agents (13 of them).
However after 3 rounds, 3 blue agents influence the whole network.
From these 4 examples of both WS and BA network simulations, we can see that
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Figure 7.8: BA Network - 1 - final
Figure 7.9: BA Network - 1 - history
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Figure 7.10: BA Network - 2 - initial
Figure 7.11: BA Network - 2 - final
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Figure 7.12: BA Network - 2 - history
hubs in the networks are quite influential. However if there is no hubs, the power of
influence is diminished.
We have ran a dozen more simulations for both networks. The patterns are very
similar. Most of the time, WS networks segregate into two groups (red and blue) with
a few yellow agents left occasionally. BA networks always converge into blue. Many




We started this research with a strong believe in the power of groups that people are not
only selfish like homo economicus but rather more pro-social like homo sociologicus. In
order to deeply understand human behavior, we explored in many fields such as rational
choice theory, cognitive science (autism specifically), social software. With these field
as background, we eventually settled our research focus on group coordination that is
achieved through bottom-up communication methods.
8.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we are primarily interested decentralized social coordination.
When people make decisions in participating social events, they often get influenced
by different people in their social networks. We explained two possible belief update
methods, namely Friend Influence and Expert Influence. Instead of assuming large
amount of common knowledge, we assume limited local knowledge. We introduced
a simple indicator for influence in a network. Sometimes two belief updates lead to
two different suggestions. When this happens, each individual can use the influence
indicator to assess the potential influence of various groups, e.g. her friends or the
expert. Given the two options, each agent can make a strategic decision that maximizes
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her benefits. We also discussed how different network structures may affect agents’
decisions. In some structures, the two methods always have the same influence. In
some structures, such as a star, we can predicate the choice of agents by looking at
their positions in the network.
Our simulation reflects our theoretical finding, which shows the importance of the
network structure in spreading social powers.
8.2 Future Directions
It is clear that this is just a start of truly understanding human as homo sociologicus
as in how we coordinate and achieve wonders in large groups. There are multiple
directions that we can pursue.
Firstly, a more properly defined language of influence can be developed. So far,
we have set inference rules, discussed examples of influence and simulated it. A
well-defined language can give us a deeper understanding. It will probably also allow
us to have more experts in one field.
Secondly, there are many network properties that we can explore further in terms
of social influence. It would be interesting to explore the relationship between the
network positions of the expert and spreading of the influence.
Last but not least important is to study the relationship between self utility and
group utility [41]. Although there is strong evidence of social conformity [99], we, as
intelligent beings, have our own minds. For certain issues, we may follow the crowd.
But there are definitely issues that are so important to us, we are not willing to change
our mind even if people around us hold different opinions.
Bibliography
[1] R. Albert and A.-L. Barabási. Statistical mechanics of complex networks. Reviews
of modern physics, 74(1):47, 2002.
[2] R. Albert, H. Jeong, and A.-L. Barabási. Internet: Diameter of the world-wide
web. Nature, 401(6749):130–131, 1999.
[3] C. E. Alchourrón, P. Gärdenfors, and D. Makinson. On the logic of theory change:
Partial meet contraction and revision functions. The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
50(02):510–530, 1985.
[4] J. Andreoni. Cooperation in public-goods experiments: Kindness or confusion?
The American Economic Review, 85(4):891–904, 1995.
[5] F. J. Anscombe and R. J. Aumann. A definition of subjective probability. The
annals of mathematical statistics, 34(1):199–205, 1963.
[6] K. Arrow. Social Choice and Individual Values. Cowles Commission for Research
in Economics: Monographs. John Wiley & Sons, 1966.
[7] K. J. Arrow. Rational Choice Functions and Orderings. Economica, 26(102):122,
1959.
[8] W. B. Arthur. Inductive reasoning and bounded rationality. American Economic
Review, 84(2):406–11, May 1994.
[9] W. B. Arthur. Inductive reasoning and bounded rationality. The American
economic review, pages 406–411, 1994.
[10] A.-L. Barabási. Network science book. Center for Complex Network Research,
Northeastern University, 2012.
[11] A.-L. Barabási and R. Albert. Emergence of scaling in random networks. science,
286(5439):509–512, 1999.
[12] D. Bernoulli. Exposition of a new theory on the measurement of risk (translated
version). Econometrica, 22(1):23–36, Jan. 1954.
[13] A. Cassar. Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world




[14] T. Chappell. Plato on knowledge in the theaetetus. In E. N. Zalta, editor, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2013 edition, 2013.
[15] H. Chernoff. Rational selection of decision functions. Econometrica: journal of
the Econometric Society, pages 422–443, 1954.
[16] M. S.-Y. Chwe. Rational ritual: Culture, coordination, and common knowledge.
Princeton University Press, 2013.
[17] R. Dahrendorf. Homo sociologicus: de categorie van de sociale rol. Paul Brand,
1958.
[18] D. Davis and C. Holt. Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press,
1993.
[19] G. Debreu. Representation of a preference ordering by a numerical function.
Decision processes, pages 159–165, 1954.
[20] F. Dretske. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. The David Hume series of
philosophy and cognitive sciences reissues. CSLI Publications, 1981.
[21] F. Y. Edgeworth. Mathematical Psychics. Number edgeworth1881 in History
of Economic Thought Books. McMaster University Archive for the History of
Economic Thought, 1881.
[22] P. Erdös and A. Rényi. On the central limit theorem for samples from a finite
population. Publ. Math. Inst. Hungar. Acad. Sci, 4:49–61, 1959.
[23] E. Fehr and C. F. Camerer. Social neuroeconomics: the neural circuitry of social
preferences. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(10):419 – 427, 2007.
[24] E. Fehr and U. Fischbacher. Why social preferences matter - the impact of
non-selfish motives on competition, cooperation and incentives. The Economic
Journal, 112(478):C1–C33, 2002.
[25] E. Fehr and S. Gächter. Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity.
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 14:159–181, 2000.
[26] E. Fehr and S. Gächter. Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments.
The American Economic Review, 90(4), 2002.
[27] V. Gallese. The roots of empathy: the shared manifold hypothesis and the neural
basis of intersubjectivity. Psychopathology, 36(4):171–180, 2003.
[28] V. Gallese and A. Goldman. Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-
reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2(12):493 – 501, 1998.
[29] I. Gilboa. Rational choice. MIT Press, 2010.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 81
[30] H. Gintis. The local best response criterion: An epistemic approach to equilibrium
refinement. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71(2):89–97, 2009.
[31] T. Grandin and S. Barron. The Unwritten Rules of Social Relationships: Decoding
Social Mysteries Through the Unique Perspectives of Autism. Future Horizons,
2005.
[32] A. Greenwald, B. Mishra, and R. Parikh. The santa fe bar problem revisited:
Theoretical and practical implications. the Stony Brook workshop on Game
Theory., 1998.
[33] W. Güth, R. Schmittberger, and B. Schwarze. An experimental analysis of
ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3(4):367–
388, 1982.
[34] J. C. Harsanyi and R. Selten. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games.
MIT Press Books, 1, 1988.
[35] J. Henrich, R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis, and R. McElreath.
In search of homo economicus: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies.
The American Economic Review, 91(2):73–78, 2001.
[36] J. Hintikka. Knowledge and belief: an introduction to the logic of the two notions,
volume 181. Cornell University Press Ithaca, 1962.
[37] R. Hobson. Autism And The Development Of Mind. Essays in Developmental
Psychology. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1995.
[38] R. P. Hobson, J. Ouston, and A. Lee. What’s in a face? the case of autism.
British Journal of Psychology, 79(4):441–453, 1988.
[39] H. S. Houthakker. Revealed preference and the utility function. Economica,
17(66):159–174, May 1950.
[40] R. Isaac, K. McCue, and C. Plott. Public goods provision in an experimental
environment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 26:51 –74, 1985.
[41] S. Jain and R. Parikh. Modeling plural identities and their interactions. The
27th International Conference On Game Theory, 2016.
[42] L. Kanner. Autistic disturbances of affective contact. Nervous child, 2(3):217–250,
1943.
[43] S. A. Kripke. Semantical analysis of modal logic i normal modal propositional
calculi. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 9(5-6):67–96, 1963.
[44] A. M. Leslie. Pretense and representation: The origins of "theory of mind.".
Psychological Review, 94(4):412 – 426, 1987.
[45] D. K. Lewis. Convention. Harvard University Press, 1969.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 82
[46] C. List and P. Pettit. Aggregating sets of judgments: An impossibility result.
Economics and Philosophy, 18(01):89–110, 2002.
[47] F. Liu, J. Seligman, and P. Girard. Logical dynamics of belief change in the
community. Synthese, pages 1–29, 2014.
[48] R. Luce and H. Raiffa. Games and decisions: Introduction and critical surveys.
Wiley, 1957.
[49] A. Mas-Colell. Efficiency and decentralization in the pure theory of public goods.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94(4):626–641, 1980.
[50] J. S. Miller. On the definition and method of political economy, , and on the
method of investigation proper to it. London and Westminster Review, October
1836.
[51] R. Millikan. Varieties Of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures. Bradford
Book. Mit Press, 2004.
[52] J. F. Nash. The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 18(2):155–162, 1950.
[53] M. E. J. Newman. The structure and function of complex networks. SIAM
REVIEW, 45:167–256, 2003.
[54] R. O’Gorman, J. Henrich, and M. V. Vugt. Constraining free riding in public
goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation.
Proceeding of Royal Society Biological Science, 276(1655), 2009.
[55] E. Ostrom, J. Walker, and R. Gardner. Covenants With and Without a Sword:
Self-Governance is Possible. The American Political Science Review, 86(2):404–
417, 1992.
[56] R. Parikh. The logic of games and its applications. Annals of discrete mathematics,
24(1):1, 1985.
[57] R. Parikh. Language as social software. In International Congress on Logic,
Methodology and Philosophy of Science, volume 415, 1995.
[58] R. Parikh. Social software. Synthese, 132(3):187–211, 2002.
[59] R. Parikh. Levels of knowledge, games, and group action. Research in Economics,
57(3):267 – 281, 2003.
[60] R. Parikh. Knowledge and structure in social algorithms. In Proceedings of the
11th International Conference on Relational Methods in Computer Science and
6th International Conference on Applications of Kleene Algebra: Relations and
Kleene Algebra in Computer Science, RelMiCS ’09/AKA ’09, pages 1–12, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2009. Springer-Verlag.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 83
[61] R. Parikh. Knowledge, games and tales from the east. In Proceedings of the 3rd
Indian Conference on Logic and Its Applications, ICLA ’09, pages 65–76, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2009. Springer-Verlag.
[62] R. Parikh. Beth definability, interpolation and language splitting. Synthese,
179(2):211–221, 2011.
[63] R. Parikh. Is there a logic of society? In Proof, Computation and Agency, pages
19–31. Springer, 2011.
[64] R. Parikh. Epistemic reasoning in life and literature. In David Makinson on
Classical Methods for Non-Classical Problems, pages 143–153. Springer, 2014.
[65] R. Parikh and P. Krasucki. Communication, consensus, and knowledge. Journal
of Economic Theory, 52(1):178–189, October 1990.
[66] R. Parikh and P. Krasucki. Levels of knowledge in distributed systems. Sadhana,
17(1):167–191, 1992.
[67] R. Parikh and R. Ramanujam. Distributed processes and the logic of knowledge.
In Proceedings of the Conference on Logic of Programs, pages 256–268, London,
UK, UK, 1985. Springer-Verlag.
[68] R. Parikh and A. Renero. Plato and gettier, a comparison. The Memory of
Horacio Ario Costa, October.
[69] R. Parikh, C. Tasdemir, and A. Witzel. The power of knowledge in games.
International Game Theory Review, 15(04), 2013.
[70] J. Persky. The ethology of homo economicus. Journal of Economic Perspectives,
9(2):221–231, Spring 1995.
[71] T. Rader. The existence of a utility function to represent preferences. The Review
of Economic Studies, pages 229–232, 1963.
[72] E. Ravasz, A. L. Somera, D. A. Mongru, Z. N. Oltvai, and A.-L. Barabási. Hierar-
chical organization of modularity in metabolic networks. science, 297(5586):1551–
1555, 2002.
[73] A. E. Roth. The early history of experimental economics. Journal of the History
of Economic Thought, 15(02):184–209, 1993.
[74] A. E. Roth, V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara, and S. Zamir. Bargaining and
market behavior in jerusalem, ljubljana, pittsburgh, and tokyo: An experimental
study. The American Economic Review, 81(5):1068 – 1095, 1991.
[75] A. Rubinstein. Lecture notes in microeconomic theory: the economic agent.
Princeton University Press, 2007.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 84
[76] M. Rutter. Diagnosis and definition of childhood autism. Journal of autism and
childhood schizophrenia, 8(2):139–161, 1978.
[77] O. Sacks. An Anthropologist on Mars. Picador, 1995.
[78] P. Samuelson. A note on the pure theory of consumer’s behaviour. Economica,
51(17), 1938.
[79] A. G. Sanfey, J. K. Rilling, J. A. Aronson, L. E. Nystrom, and J. D. Cohen. The
Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game. Science,
300(5626):1755–1758, 2003.
[80] F. Satari. Information transmission in communication games: Signaling with an
audiance. Ph.D. dissertation, June 2013.
[81] L. Savage. The foundations of statistics, 1954.
[82] F. Schneider and W. Pommerehne. Free riding and collective action: An ex-
periment in poublic microeconomics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
96(4):689–704, 1981.
[83] M. Sefton, R. Shupp, and J. Walker. The effect of rewards and sanctions in
provision of public good. Economic Inquiry, 45(4):671–690, 2007.
[84] A. Sen. Collective choice and social welfare. 1970.
[85] A. Sen. Rational fools: A critique of the behavioral foundations of economic
theory. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6(4):317–344, 1977.
[86] A. Sen. Internal consistency of choice. Econometrica, 61(3), 1993.
[87] A. K. Sen. Choice functions and revealed preference. Review of Economic Studies,
38(115):307–17, July 1971.
[88] H. A. Simon. Bounded rationality and organizational learning. Organization
Science, 2(1):pp. 125–134, 1991.
[89] A. Smith. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
Number smith1776 in History of Economic Thought Books. McMaster University
Archive for the History of Economic Thought, 1776.
[90] M. Steup. Epistemology. In E. N. Zalta, editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Spring 2014 edition, 2014.
[91] D. A. Treffert. The idiot savant: A review of the syndrome. The American
Journal of Psychiatry, 145(5):563–572, 1998.
[92] Uta Frith. A mature view of autism. Autism: Explaining the Enigma. Trends
Cognitive Science, 7(9):380–383, 2003.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 85
[93] M. van ’t Wout, R. Kahn, A. Sanfey, and A. Aleman. Affective state and decision-
making in the ultimatum game. Experimental Brain Research, 169(4):564 – 568,
2006.
[94] J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.
Princeton University Press, 1944.
[95] G. H. Von Wright. An essay in modal logic. 1951.
[96] D. J. Watts. The "new" science of networks. Annual review of sociology, pages
243–270, 2004.
[97] D. J. Watts and S. H. Strogatz. Collective dynamics of’small-world’networks.
nature, 393(6684):440, 1998.
[98] J. Williams, A. Whiten, T. Suddendorf, and D. Perrett. Imitation, mirror neurons
and autism. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 25(4):287 – 295, 2001.
[99] H. Wu, Y. Luo, and C. Feng. Neural signatures of social conformity: A coordinate-
based activation likelihood estimation meta-analysis of functional brain imaging
studies. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 71:101–111, 2016.
